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PROSECUTION IN 3-D
KAY L. LEVINE & RONALD F. WRIGHT ∗
Despite the multidimensional nature of the prosecutor’s work, legal
scholars tend to offer a comparatively flat portrait of the profession,
providing insight into two dimensions that shape the prosecutor’s
performance. Accounts in the first dimension look outward toward external
institutions that bear on prosecutors’ case-handling decisions, such as
judicial review or the legislative codes that define crimes and punishments.
Sketches in the second dimension encourage us to look inward, toward the
prosecutor’s individual conscience.
In this Article we add depth to the existing portrait of prosecution by
exploring a third dimension: the office structure and the professional
identity it helps to produce or reinforce. In addition to understanding the
office’s explicit policies, new prosecutors must discover the unwritten
social rules, norms, and language of the profession and of their particular
offices. These informal instructions do more than simply define how a
prosecutor acts; they define who a prosecutor is. Our theory of prosecution
also explains how different dimensions of the role interact. The structure of
a prosecutor’s office helps determine and bolster the professional identity
of the attorneys who work there; that identity, in turn, has the capacity to

*

Associate Professor of Law, Emory University; Needham Y. Gulley Professor of
Criminal Law, Wake Forest University. Many thanks to Rachel Barkow, Darryl Brown,
Sam Buell, Bill Buzbee, Jennifer Collins, Ingrid Eagly, Brandon Garrett, Nancy King, Marc
Miller, Daniel Reach, Dan Richman, Kami Simmons, and David Sklansky for comments on
an early draft, and to our friends and colleagues at Emory and Wake Forest for their insights
during workshop presentations. Marc Miller also provided invaluable input in the creation
of our interview questions. Sam Buell deserves special mention for suggesting the “threedimension” imagery that we use to frame our contribution. Thanks are also due to the law
faculties of the University of California at Irvine, the University of Arizona, Arizona State
University, and the University of Virginia; the participants of the Emory-UGA 2011
Summer Roundtable; and the attendees of the May 2011 Law and Society Annual Meeting in
San Francisco, who inspired us to dig deeper. Lastly, we would like to thank our former
colleagues at the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office in Riverside, California and at
the Department of Justice for providing excellent role models at the start of our respective
careers. Excellent research assistance was provided by law students Lauren Branchini,
Kaitlyn Girard, Elizabeth Redpath, Ramie Shalabi, and Kristi Miller North. A grant from
Wake Forest University made possible the empirical components of this research.

1119

1120

KAY L. LEVINE & RONALD F. WRIGHT

[Vol. 102

powerfully shape the prosecutor’s outputs.
To investigate this third dimension of criminal prosecution at the state
level, we conducted semi-structured interviews with misdemeanor and drug
prosecutors in three offices during the 2010 calendar year. Our discussion
here focuses on two particular features of office structure—the hierarchical
shape of the organization’s workforce and the hiring preference for
experience—to examine differences they can make in a prosecutor’s
professional identity. In particular, the prosecutor’s basic attitude toward
autonomy (or, conversely, the team) produces ripple effects on her
relationships with other lawyers and police and on the value she places on
achieving consistency across cases. By viewing prosecution through this
lens, we hope to offer managers of prosecutors’ offices greater power to
shape the work of their attorneys and to give the public deeper insight
about the work done in its name in the criminal courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The criminal prosecutor works in many different professional
environments: in community meetings, in consultations with the police, in
misdemeanor and felony courtrooms, in sentencing commission and
legislative hearings, and in budget meetings. The professional experiences
of this courtroom actor extend far beyond the courthouse doors.
Despite the multidimensional nature of the prosecutor’s work, many
legal scholars paint a comparatively flat portrait of the profession, providing
insight into two dimensions that shape the prosecutor’s performance.
Accounts in the first dimension look outward toward external institutions
that shape prosecutors’ case-handling decisions. These external checks
come from the legislative codes that define crimes and punishments, jury
and judicial review of the evidence, and the ethics enforcers within the legal
profession, among others. When scholars assess prosecutorial behavior
along this first dimension, they usually conclude that external institutions
offer too much space for the prosecutor to roam and too little control over
prosecutorial discretion.
Sketches in the second dimension encourage us to look inward, toward
the prosecutor’s individual conscience. In these portrayals, the lawyers
who work in the prosecutor’s office over the long haul are idealistic people,
willing to accept a reduced salary for the opportunity to serve the public.
Personal experience and morality guide them in prioritizing among crimes
and in designing prosecution strategies to promote public safety. This
internal and individualized account, while true in some respects, offers little
explanation for why prosecutors in some places seem to do the work
differently than prosecutors in other places, and no guidance for chief
prosecutors looking to improve results or the workplace environment in
their offices.
In this Article we add depth to the existing portrait of prosecution by
exploring a third dimension: the office structure and the professional
identity it helps to produce or reinforce. Looking to institutional forces
within the office itself can show us in greater detail how a prosecutor
experiences her professional role and the rule-of-law implications of that
role. 1 This deeper look at prosecution examines more than just the contents
1

Some of our earlier work began this inquiry into the effects of office structure on
prosecutors, a topic suggested to us by the time each of us spent working in prosecutors’
offices. For an exploration of the power of leaders in a prosecutor’s office to shift the
practices of line prosecutors, even on a matter as integral to the job as the use of plea
bargaining, see Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55
STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002). For an account of policies concerning the enforcement of the
range of statutory rape cases, see Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial
Discretion, Privacy and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691 (2006).
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of explicit office policies. In addition to understanding the official policies,
new prosecutors must discover the unwritten social rules, norms, and
language of the profession and of their offices. Newcomers learn these
expectations informally, whether through lunchtime chats or through
careful observation of how veterans behave and speak. These informal
instructions do more than simply define how a prosecutor acts; they define
who a prosecutor is.
Our theory of prosecution also explains how different dimensions of
the role interact. The structure of a prosecutor’s office helps determine or
reinforce the professional identity of the attorneys who work there; that
identity, we believe, has the capacity to powerfully shape the prosecutors’
outputs, including choices about charges, dispositions, and relationships
with police.
By invoking the concept of office structure, we refer not to the
physical edifice in which the prosecutor’s office sits.2 Instead, we have the
social architecture of the workplace in mind: those alignments and routines
inside the workspace that organize the staff to handle its caseload. When
the chief prosecutor decides whom to hire, how much to pay them, how to
divide the work, how to train newcomers, how to monitor the work, and
how to respond when staff prosecutors exercise poor judgment, attorneys
learn from these choices what it means to be a good prosecutor.
In an effort to investigate this third dimension of criminal prosecution
at the state level, 3 we carried out fieldwork in two metropolitan areas in the
Southeast during the 2010 calendar year. We conducted 121 semistructured interviews with line prosecutors and supervisors in locations that
we call the Metro County District Attorney’s Office, the Midway County
Solicitor General’s Office, and the Ring County District Attorney’s Office.
In this first Article in a forthcoming series, we concentrate on a subset of
forty-two interviews—those of the misdemeanor prosecutors and the drug
For a description of other scholarly inquiries into the influence of the office, see infra Part
II.B.
2
For works exploring the impact of physical space on human behavior in a legal context,
see, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); CORNELIA
VISMANN, FILES: LAW AND MEDIA TECHNOLOGY (Geoffrey Winthrop-Young trans., Stanford
University Press 2008); Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J.
1039 (2002).
3
Given the distinctive caseloads and professional environments of federal prosecutors,
we concentrated on state prosecutors’ offices, where the great majority of criminal
prosecutions happen. For an insightful discussion of how structural issues can affect the
decisionmaking of federal prosecutors, see Rachel Barkow, Institutional Design and the
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Adminstrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 913–21
(2009) (arguing that the investigation and adversarial functions in federal prosecution offices
should be split between two distinct sets of employees, so as to make charging and trial
decisions more objective).
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prosecutors—because those attorneys perform comparable jobs in three
different office environments and therefore illuminate the structural
questions that concern us here. Our work is theory-generating, allowing us
to formulate and sharpen theories about the culture of prosecutors’ offices,
the professional identities of those who work there, and the potential
impacts of those professional identities on office outputs.4
What we heard in those interviews sometimes surprised us, and at
other times confirmed familiar assumptions about the prosecutor’s work.
Two particular features of office structure drew our attention: the flat or
pyramidal shape of the organization’s workforce and the preference for
hiring experienced attorneys or recent graduates into entry-level positions.
These features of the office’s social architecture correlate with distinctive
professional identities of the prosecutors who work there. For example,
attorneys who work in pyramidal offices and who are hired without
experience (as in Metro County) tend to accept bureaucratic and group
values. A strong team spirit marks their professional identities. On the
other hand, attorneys in an office such as Midway County, characterized by
a flatter structure and more experienced hires, display professional identities
that are decidedly more independent; they feel no particular obligation to
match their own outputs to the decisions of their peers or to the policies of
their superiors.
These are autonomous, rule-defying prosecutors.
Surprisingly, an attorney’s team-member-versus-autonomous-actor identity
correlates more strongly with his office’s social architecture than with his
gender or race.
We also found that the prosecutor’s basic orientation toward autonomy
or the team produced ripple effects on his relationships with other lawyers
and police. Attorneys with a more autonomous professional identity tended
to report more interest in the work of prosecutors outside their own office;
they also dealt with the police in a more self-assured way. Lastly, our data
suggest that a prosecutor’s professional identity might affect, or be reflected
in, the outcomes she achieves in criminal cases and the consistency of those
outcomes.
The argument proceeds as follows. After briefly reviewing the
standard two dimensions of prosecutorial behavior in Part II.A, we turn in
Part II.B to the third dimension of prosecution—office structure. We
introduce there our theory, which traces the connections between office
4

As with other theory-generating work, a great deal of work remains to elaborate and
test the theories we develop here. Cf. Samuel Bloom, Socialization for the Physician’s Role:
A Review of Some Contributions of Research to Theory, in BECOMING A PHYSICIAN:
DEVELOPMENT OF VALUES AND ATTITUDES IN MEDICINE 3 (Eileen Shapiro & Leah
Lowenstein eds., 1979); Ester Carolina Apesoa-Varano, Educated Caring: The Emergence
of Professional Identity Among Nurses, 30 QUALITATIVE SOC. 249 (2007).
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structure, professional identity, and prosecutor outcomes. Part III describes
our research methodology, as well as the three research sites for this study.
In Part IV we present qualitative evidence from our research sites to support
our hypothesis about the relationship between office shape and hiring
preference and the professional identities of prosecutors. Part V considers
the potential effects of the prosecutor’s self-identity on the output of the
office.
By viewing prosecution through the lenses of social architecture and
professional identity, we hope to make managers of prosecutors’ offices
more effective in shaping the work of their attorneys. Our analysis also
gives journalists, academic commentators, and other observers a basis for
evaluating prosecutors in systemic and policy terms, rather than secondguessing prosecution choices in particular cases.
Ultimately, an
appreciation of the effects of office structure can give the voting public
deeper insight about the work done in its name in the criminal courts.
The effects of the third dimension are sometimes difficult to notice,
particularly for legally trained observers who tend to look for explicit rules
as behavioral guideposts. This Article thus provides readers with a new
way of seeing the state prosecutor. It is not the only way: studies of
external institutional constraints and individual prosecutor character also
offer valuable insights about prosecutors. We offer here (to invoke a
famous metaphor) only one view of the Cathedral. To fully understand the
institution of criminal prosecution, “one must see them all.” 5
II. THREE DIMENSIONS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
In an effort to understand the fascinating and multifarious work of
criminal prosecutors, one could invoke several different perspectives, or
units of analysis. Much of the legal scholarship focuses on the external
environment of the prosecutor’s office, tracing the interaction between the
prosecutor’s office and various other legal institutions, including the
judiciary, legislatures, sentencing commissions, and others. The unit of
analysis in this sort of work is a complete justice system, including all of its
interlocking institutions.
In contrast, the professional-development
perspective on criminal prosecution takes the individual prosecutor as the
unit of analysis, looking inward to the moral responsibility of the line
prosecutor for the wise use of discretion. While external institutional
relations and individual integrity offer two useful vantage points on the
work of criminal prosecutors, there is a third possibility that receives
surprisingly little attention: the effects that flow from the internal structure
5
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 n.2 (1972).
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of the prosecutor’s office.
A. THE EXTERNAL AND INDIVIDUAL DIMENSIONS OF
PROSECUTION
Prosecutors have broad powers, and one might measure that breadth by
mapping the outer boundaries that various legal actors and institutions set
for prosecutorial discretion. Whether considered separately or together,
those external institutions leave enormous room for prosecutors to shape
criminal justice outcomes. 6
The first place to look for external regulations on prosecutorial
behavior is the criminal code crafted by the state legislature. Crime
definitions and statutes authorizing penalties, however, tend over time to
multiply—not restrain—the legal tools available to prosecutors. Legislators
amend criminal codes to cover more behavior, to increase the range of
punishments that apply to criminal behavior, and to intensify the overlap
among criminal code provisions. 7
Like the legislature, the judiciary usually does not temper the decisions
of criminal prosecutors. 8 When criminal defendants invite judges to
override prosecutors’ choices about filing or dismissing charges, judges
view those requests through the lens of the separation of powers doctrine.
In that light, prosecutorial decisions appear to be quintessential executive
choices. 9 Applying the formal law of due process, the judge considers only
6

For more complete reviews of the practical limits on strategies for control of prosecutor
discretion, see ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR (2007); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (2009); Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization,
Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155 (2005).
7
See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1276 (2005); Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties:
Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641
(2002); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2005). In settings where the criminal law regulates
business practices or where the pool of potential criminal defendants is already well
organized, legislatures do sometimes repeal criminal statutes. See Darryl K. Brown,
Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 225 (2007).
8
Of course, judges can control prosecutorial behavior inside their courtrooms. See, e.g.,
JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
CRIMINAL COURTS 21 (1977).
9
See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979) (explaining that when there
are two overlapping firearms statutes with different penalty schemes, the Government may
choose which one to include in the indictment). As Judge Gerard Lynch famously phrased
it, we now operate an “administrative” criminal justice system, where the important
decisions typically happen in charging and plea negotiations, before the case ever makes it to
trial. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2118 (1998).
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whether the charges have some minimal factual support in the available
evidence; there is no “least restrictive alternative” requirement.10
While the willingness of legislatures and judges to shape the choices of
prosecutors is muted, further potential checks might come from the voters
who elect the chief prosecutor 11 or from state bar authorities who license all
prosecuting attorneys in the jurisdiction. 12 Like the legislators and the
judges, though, these institutions deliver less accountability for prosecutors
than one might hope. Prosecutorial elections are marked by heavy
incumbency advantages and empty rhetoric, and meaningful disciplinary
sanctions from bar authorities tend to be few and far between.13
Taken together, these external institutions probably have some
cumulative regulatory effects on prosecutors. They help to ensure that
prosecutors’ actions comply with the law and with current public priorities.
They do not, however, fully explain why prosecutors act the way they do.
To understand prosecutorial actions, we have to consider more than the
breadth of the power granted to prosecutors by other legal actors.
Some authors therefore have articulated a second dimension to
prosecution, one that focuses on the individual prosecutor’s internal moral
compass. According to this account, when it comes to exercising judgment,
an attorney’s conscience keeps her in line. As an individual, and without
prompting from others, she will behave responsibly despite the adversary
pressures of her role. “A prosecutor is expected to possess moral and
ethical principles, integrity, and the courage to do the right thing.” 14 The
10

Judges, however, have reserved the right to overturn a prosecutorial decision in the
rare case where a defendant stumbles upon proof that the decision was based on race,
gender, or some other prohibited ground. See Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)
(stating that a prosecution may not be based on “an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification”).
11
See STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 3 (2006); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor
Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 589–91 (2009) [hereinafter Prosecutor
Elections]; Ronald F. Wright, Public Defender Elections and Popular Control over Criminal
Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 803 (2010).
12
Bar authorities bring few disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors, and light
punishments are commonplace in the exceptional cases finding prosecutorial misconduct.
See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 292 (2007); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of
Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 725–43 (2001). The notable exception to this trend is the
recent disbarring of Durham, North Carolina Prosecutor Mike Nifong, following his
unsupported prosecution of three Duke University students for rape of an exotic dancer.
Lara Setrakian & Chris Francescani, Former Duke Prosecutor Nifong Disbarred, ABC
NEWS (June 16, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3285862&page=1.
13
See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 282–92; Wright, Prosecutor Elections, supra note 11, at
591–606.
14
Joseph Cassily, A Prosecutor Is a Lawyer with Convictions, NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’YS
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prosecutor “may strike hard blows” but “is not at liberty to strike foul
ones.” 15
Such familiar quotes speak to the professional integrity of the
prosecutor as an individual, and they may well characterize many of the
professionals who hold this role. Indeed, for many prosecutors, one’s
personal background, training, and professional experiences help to form
and ground this internal moral compass, providing stability and guidance
over time. 16
But prosecutors—as professionals—are more than (or perhaps less
than) the sum total of these individual traits and experiences.17
Observations about the individual character of a prosecuting attorney do not
address the institutional environment in which she works or acknowledge
ASS’N MAG. Apr.–June 2009, at 4, 10.
15
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). For a critique of the individualistic
view of prosecutors underlying a recent Supreme Court decision, see Susan A. Bandes, The
Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick
v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (2011).
16
A lawyer’s original ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic community has been found
relevant to his place in the profession, see, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN,
CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982). Political party preference,
job experience, and gender have been found to be significantly related to attitudes about
punishment and courthouse reputation. ROY B. FLEMMING, PETER F. NARDULLI & JAMES
EISENSTEIN, THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES
75 (1992) [hereinafter THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE]. Recent studies of lawyers have paid special
attention to the development of connections to outsiders to gauge the depth and breadth of
professional networks. See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005); ROBERT L. NELSON ET AL., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND
RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (2009), available at
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/publications/sterling/AJD2.pdf; John P. Heinz
& Edward O. Laumann, The Constituencies of Elite Urban Lawyers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
441 (1997); Anthony Paik, John P. Heinz & Anne Southworth, Political Lawyers: The
Structure of a National Network, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 892 (2011).
17
See Howard S. Becker & James Carper, The Elements of Identification with an
Occupation, 21 AM. SOC. REV. 341 (1956); Meryl Reis Louis, Surprise and Sense Making:
What Newcomers Experience in Entering Unfamiliar Organizational Settings, 25 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 226 (1980). The literature examining professional socialization has concentrated on
newcomers to the medical profession and for-profit business executives. For examples of
the former, see DONALD LIGHT, The Moral Career of the Psychiatric Resident, in BECOMING
PSYCHIATRISTS: THE PROFESSIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF SELF 241, 241–58 (1980); ApesoaVarano, supra note 4; Brenda L. Beagan, “Even If I Don’t Know What I’m Doing I Can
Make It Look Like I Know What I’m Doing”: Becoming a Doctor in the 1990s, 38 CAN. REV.
OF SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 275 (2001); Bloom, supra note 4. For examples of studies in the
for-profit business sector, see LINDA A. HILL, BECOMING A MANAGER: MASTERY OF A NEW
IDENTITY (1992); Herminia Ibarra, Provisional Selves: Experimenting with Image and
Identity in Professional Adaptation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 764, 769 (1999); Abraham Sagie &
Jacob Weisberg, A Structural Analysis of Behavior in Work Situations Shared by Group
Members, 130 J. PSYCHOL. 371 (1996).
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the interplay between the pressures of this environment and her personal
values. 18 Like most professionals who work in organizations, prosecutors
shape and filter their backgrounds to reinforce the professional image they
want to achieve, in light of the expectations of the people around them. In
short, while the internal dimension may reveal some personal truths, it does
not account for structural aspects of the profession or illuminate geographic
or temporal trends.
B. THE THIRD DIMENSION: THE INFLUENCE OF THE OFFICE
The portrait of the prosecutor we find in the legal literature thus
appears two-dimensional: not incorrect, but incomplete. When deciding
how to do their jobs, prosecutors do more than simply listen to their own
consciences or respond to (or ignore) outside legal, environmental, or
policy pressures. They also work within the particular social architecture of
their office and immerse themselves in attitudes about the job that come
with membership in an organization.
For scholars interested in
understanding why prosecutors think and behave the way they do, the office
is an important but previously understudied third dimension of prosecution.
Various organizational features of the prosecutor’s office—size of the
workforce, status hierarchies, hiring strategies, job assignments,
promotional ladders, access to the boss, and the like 19—structure the
professional identities and work lives of the attorneys in the office. These
aspects of the social architecture inside the office combine with aspects of
the office’s external professional environment, such as the proximity to the
18

Academics frequently adopt this perspective when praising the willingness of
prosecutors to consider more than wins and losses at trial. See David Luban, The
Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2010). Many published memoirs of state
prosecutors affirm the role of individual conscience, but emphasize the challenges that tend
to prevent prosecutors from following that guidance consistently. See DAVID HEILBRONER,
ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYS AND NIGHTS OF A YOUNG D.A. (1990) (Manhattan); SARENA STRAUS,
BRONX DA: TRUE STORIES FROM THE SEX CRIMES AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNIT (2006);
JOHN SUTHERS, NO HIGHER CALLING, NO GREATER RESPONSIBILITY: A PROSECUTOR MAKES
HIS CASE (2008) (Colorado).
19
For example, others have documented the particular impact of specialized prosecution
units on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see Dawn Beichner & Cassia Spohn,
Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases: Examining the Impact of a
Specialized Prosecution Unit, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 461 (2005); David C. Pyrooz et al.,
Gang-Related Homicide Charging Decisions: The Implementation of a Specialized
Prosecution Unit in Los Angeles, 22 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 3 (2011), and on the inverse
relationship between office size and rate of declination, see Michael Edmund O’Neill,
Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive
Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1447–48 (2004). For a discussion of the general
impact of combined prosecution functions on the objectivity of filing and plea-bargaining
decisions, see Barkow, supra note 3.
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courthouse, relationships with the defense bar, relationships with the
judiciary, stability of courtroom personnel, and docket size and diversity, to
produce the overall institutional environment.
1. The Office as a Unit of Analysis in Prior Literature
More than a generation ago a handful of socio-legal scholars set out to
explain the influence of the prosecutor’s office on the individual
prosecutor’s job. More specifically, they looked for external relationships
or environmental factors that might affect a prosecutor’s willingness to plea
bargain. For example, in her classic work Settling the Facts, Pamela Utz
identified a number of institutional conditions responsible for producing
variability in plea-bargaining rates in two California jurisdictions: Alameda
She concluded that Alameda’s
County and San Diego County. 20
comparatively higher rates of negotiated pleas resulted from the interaction
of legal institutions in that county, along with aspects of the broader
political and social climates. First, she pointed to the relatively strong
public defense bar and the active role of the Alameda County judiciary in
twisting arms to secure pleas in advance of trial. 21 Second, she reported
that Alameda had long suffered from high rates of violent crime, while San
Diego had only recently experienced an upsurge in those crimes.22 San
Diego also had a more conservative population than Alameda, 23 which left
the office leadership unwilling to appear soft on crime through negotiations
with defendants. 24
A few years later Leonard Mellon, Joan Jacoby, and Marion Brewer
studied ten jurisdictions across the United States, looking for structural
features that “affect the uniformity, the quality, and the equality of justice
administered by local prosecutors.” 25 The authors concluded that in some
20

PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL
COURT (1978).
21
See UTZ, supra note 20, at ch. 9; see also THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 24–
37 (arguing that chief prosecutors choose one of three political styles—courthouse insurgent,
policy reformer, or office conservator—based on strategic concerns over their status vis-àvis the bench and the defense bar and personal views about the expected value of creating
conflict by changing this status).
22
See UTZ, supra note 20, at xi. Utz also discussed the management styles of the office
leadership—San Diego tightly supervised its deputies, while Alameda was more loosely
organized and allowed its employees to exercise independent judgment—but these factors
were peripheral to the question she intended to study. The core question of her study was
why one office allowed more discretion in case handling than the other. Her insights about
control from the top will, however, be useful to us in our discussion of internal structural
features that influence professional identity.
23
UTZ, supra note 20, at 43–44.
24
Id. at 51–67.
25
Leonard R. Mellon, Joan E. Jacoby & Marion A. Brewer, The Prosecutor Constrained
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places, “the external environment imposes substantial limits on a
prosecutor’s ability to act.” 26 For example, they found that caseload size,
prosecutors’ trust in the local police force, the demographic character of the
jurisdiction, funding sources, and the values of the underlying community
can all influence policies adopted by the prosecutor’s office.27
These first-generation works catalogued the myriad ways that the
external environment constrains or enables work in the prosecutor’s office.
Because the prosecutor’s office is only one institution in a much larger
community of socio-legal actors with competing interests, these external
relationships bear heavily on the results that prosecutors tend to get with
their discretionary power.
Our theory of prosecution, like this earlier work, treats the office as an
important unit of analysis, but we take the institutional insights in a
different direction. Rather than focusing on the extrinsic influences on
prosecutorial decisionmaking, we suggest that internal features of the
prosecutor’s office frame the professional identities of prosecutors in
substantial ways. By professional identities, we mean those “attributes,
beliefs, values, motives, and experiences in terms of which people define
themselves in a professional role.” 28 Furthermore, while the earlier
generation of studies sought direct connections between environmental
features and case outputs, our theory proceeds in two stages rather than one.
We do not leap directly from internal office characteristics to prosecutorial
outputs. We instead theorize that office features primarily affect or
reinforce the professional identities of the prosecutors who work there; the
influence of this identity might then be refracted, like light through a prism,
to alter prosecutorial choices about plea bargaining, relationships with
police and other attorneys, approaches to disclosure obligations, and the
by His Environment: A New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 52 (1981); see also JOAN E. JACOBY, THE PROSECUTOR’S CHARGING
DECISION: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 2, 4 (1977). All were large offices, but the sample
contained regional diversity, including Detroit, Brooklyn, Miami, San Diego, Seattle, New
Orleans, Gary, Salt Lake City, Norfolk, and Boulder. Mellon et al., supra, at 52–53 n.1, 77
n.58.
26
Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 53.
27
Id. at 60–65; see also JACOBY, supra note 25, at 2, 4. For more recent work on the
correlation between community poverty levels, community political conservatism, and
prosecutorial dismissals, see Travis W. Franklin, Community Influence on Prosecutorial
Dismissals: A Multilevel Analysis of Case- and County-Level Factors, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 693
(2010). For recent work documenting the correlation between community demographics and
prosecutorial willingness to file charges with mandatory minimum sentences, see Jeffrey T.
Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences,
44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 427 (2007).
28
Ibarra, supra note 17, at 765 (citing EDGAR H. SCHEIN, CAREER DYNAMICS: MATCHING
INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL NEEDS (1978)).
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like. In other words, the architectural features we discuss do not themselves
cause prosecutors to handle cases a certain way. Rather, they incline
prosecutors to think of themselves and their professional role in a certain
way, and this role orientation can motivate prosecutors to make certain
professional decisions.
In support of our hypothesis that structures within the prosecutor’s
office matter to our understanding of the prosecutor’s job, we take seriously
the insights of Roy Flemming, Peter Nardulli, and James Eisenstein, who
first brought attention to the relationship between the organization of a
prosecutor’s office and the political style of its leader. 29 In their focus on
more than just the work product of the organization’s employees, Flemming
and his coauthors advocated for studies of criminal justice institutions that
address more than the “bottom line” of outputs. They warned that limiting
research on criminal institutions to case outcomes “would be like limiting
research on Congress to votes.” 30 In other words, to understand fully an
institution that operates through seemingly independent units, scholars must
do more than simply observe and record the end products generated by the
individual units. When institutional fabric ties individuals together, what
appear to be independent choices may in fact be decisions colored by
institutional roles and expectations. For that reason, the institutional fabric
itself deserves study, separate and apart from the institutional outputs. We
wholeheartedly agree, and thus have designed a study of the prosecutor’s
organization, as distinct from the outcomes that prosecutors produce.
We part ways with Flemming and his coauthors when it comes to the
significance of social architecture in a prosecutor’s office. They treated
office structure as a concrete embodiment of the chief prosecutor’s political
style and personality. 31 Because our concern is the professional identity of
the workforce rather than of the boss, we are interested more in identifying
the downstream effects of these structures than in tracing their sources.
The connection between office structures and professional identity is
not unique to criminal prosecutors; it is a common feature of professional
life. Coining the phrase “moral career” to describe the dialectical
29
THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 37–38. For Flemming and his co-authors, the
structure of the prosecutor’s organization mostly reflects the political style of its leader as an
insurgent, a reformer, or a conservator.
30
PETER F. NARDULLI, JAMES EISENSTEIN & ROY B. FLEMMING, THE TENOR OF JUSTICE:
CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS 368 (1988).
31
We agree that these features may motivate the chief prosecutor’s choices when it
comes to office structures, although the social architecture in an office also reflects
exogenous features of the landscape that might override the leader’s personality. Exogenous
features—such as annual funding allocated by the county, the decision to split the handling
of misdemeanors and felonies into two offices, or the views of career prosecutors in the
office—may not vary with electoral outcomes or leadership styles.
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relationship between one’s personal values and the interests or expectations
of one’s professional community, 32 sociologists have demonstrated in
various settings that internal routines within an office can have a profound
effect on the professional identities of the workers. 33 Moreover, one’s
professional identity is likely to change over time, particularly for
professionals who make career transitions that require them to display new
skills and attitudes as they adjust to new colleagues and new work
environments. 34
Applying this insight to lawyers, the moral career (or professional
identity) of the attorney results from the interplay between that attorney’s
personal values and the professional environment in which he works. The
professional environment, which includes the office environment but
extends further into the norms and practices of the legal profession itself, is
thus one major driver of the attorney’s professional identity. Studies of
legal aid, criminal defense, and nonprofit lawyers, with their distinctive
motivations and professional goals, provide vivid examples of this moral
career unfolding. 35 We offer here a close-up look at the moral career of the
32

Erving Goffman, The Moral Career of the Mental Patient, in ASYLUMS 125, 169
(1961); DONALD E. SUPER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CAREERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
VOCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1957); LIGHT, supra note 17, at 241–58.
33
For example, studies of health-care professionals show how a person’s career “takes
place in and is shaped by the structure” of the professional community. LIGHT, supra note
17, at 244. The literature examining professional socialization is particularly well developed
in the fields of medicine and business. For examples of the former, see LIGHT, supra note
17, Apesoa-Varano, supra note 4, and Beagan, supra note 17. For examples in the for-profit
business sector, see HILL, supra note 17, and Ibarra, supra note 17.
34
See Nigel Nicholson, A Theory of Work Role Transitions, 29 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 172
(1984); Ibarra, supra note 17, at 765. In the socialization process, people assume new roles
and learn the appropriate “display rules” that accompany their new roles; they do so in order
to assimilate into their new environment and eventually to internalize the proper identity,
whether “custodial” (accepting of the status quo) or “innovative” (inclined to make changes).
John Van Maanen & Edgar H. Schein, Toward a Theory of Organizational Socialization, in
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 209, 228–29 (Barry M. Staw ed., 1979)
(describing the difference between custodial orientation, content innovative orientation, and
role innovative orientation as fostered by office culture); Robert Sutton, Maintaining Norms
about Expressed Emotions: The Case of Bill Collectors, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 245 (1991).
Otherwise, they risk losing effectiveness or authority. See Mark R. Leary & Robin M.
Kowalski, Impression Management: A Literature Review and Two-Component Model, 107
PSYCHOL. BULL. 34, 38 (1990).
35
For studies of lawyers who work with disadvantaged populations, see, e.g., Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding of the
Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 31, 33 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 1998); Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical
Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1195 (2005); Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short
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state prosecutor, placing a spotlight on particular aspects of the office
environment that might influence or reinforce the professional identities of
the prosecutors who work there.
2. Explicit Policies as Office Structures
Which office structures correlate with the prosecutor’s professional
identity? A study of the third dimension of prosecution might naturally
start with explicit policies, announced by the Elected36 or the chief
assistant, 37 that restrict the discretion of individual line prosecutors.38 Such
policies exist in most places, at least as to certain crimes or certain
courtroom issues. 39 To be sure, bureaucratic life gives an employee plenty
of ways to evade the commands of the boss. 40 Nevertheless, it is
Life and Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1203 (2004); Marina Zaloznaya & Laura Beth Nielsen, Mechanisms and Consequences of
Professional Marginality: The Case of Poverty Lawyers Revisited, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
919 (2011). For a study of lawyers who work for politically conservative organizations, see
ANNE SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT (2008); Anthony Paik, Ann Southworth & John
P. Heinz, Lawyers of the Right: Networks and Organization, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 883
(2007).
36
Throughout this Article, we refer to the chief prosecutor of the office (the District
Attorney or the Solicitor General) as “the Elected” because this is the term prosecutors
commonly use to refer to their bosses.
37
The chief assistant in a prosecutor’s office is akin to the chief operating officer of a
corporation; she is the leader of the trial line attorneys, as well as the administrative
decisionmaker on most day-to-day matters. Her work in this regard frees up the Elected to
focus on political duties or external relationships. For the office to function well, she must
be a highly trusted and loyal associate of the Elected. See THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note
16, at 38.
38
See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089 (2010); Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by Prosecutors: The
Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE 335, 335 (1990)
(describing the prevalence of internal office policies). Note, though, that prosecutorial
policies may be somewhat primitive; as Norman Abrams put it, “most often they amount to
elementary instruction books for junior prosecutors . . . .” Norman Abrams, Internal Policy:
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8 (1971).
39
See Roy B. Flemming, The Political Styles and Organizational Strategies of American
Prosecutors: Examples from Nine Courthouse Communities, 12 LAW & POL’Y 25, 26 (1990)
(“Prosecutors, when compared to the other major actors in the courthouse, face few
constraints in constructing offices that will follow their policies . . . Prosecutors have more
freedom and less compunction in restricting the autonomy of their assistants.”). The policies
might also establish monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to learn about departures from
the announced policies and to discourage them. See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A
Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 108 (1975) (“The characteristics of his work
environment which greatly shape his own concept of the role he plays must include the
nature of the organization which employs him, the methods used for the measurement of
success, and his position in the judicial system.”).
40
See AMITAI ETZIONI, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS 68–69 (Alex Inkles ed., 1964)
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commonplace for a chief prosecutor to declare a policy on an important
topic and to make the policy stick. 41 Such formal bureaucratic controls are
a routine part of the prosecutorial services in many other countries.42
Yet explicit policies in state prosecutors’ offices form only a thin
visible crust on a deep set of office structures that shape or reinforce
attorney identity. To understand why this is so, compare the shallow reach
of a state prosecutor’s office policies to the deeper policies at work in other
organizations that employ lawyers, such as administrative agencies or large
private law firms. Administrative agencies generate an enormous volume
of internal directives for how employees should interpret and enforce
agency rules, in order to regularize their employees’ behavior. 43 The
proliferation of these documents is likely a result of the enormous size of
the agency staff and the funding and sophistication of the opposition. 44
These factors do not come into play for the typical state criminal
prosecution.
In the private law firm setting, the amount of client money at stake, the
sophistication of negotiating or litigating counterparts, and the
comparatively light caseload leads to closer supervision for junior attorneys
than the typical state prosecutor’s office can provide for its new
prosecutors. 45 Unlike the decisions of a new prosecutor, any work product
(proposing that because “a high percentage of the deviant acts are committed by a small
percentage” of the participants, organizations should devote extensive resources to screening
new recruits); THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 62–65 (describing how prosecutors
work around policies they feel are too restrictive).
41
The Elected can even force change on a significant issue, like plea bargaining, that is
central to the daily work of the office. See Mary P. Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating
Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia,
43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1080–83 (2006); Wright & Miller, supra note 1, at 57.
42
See David T. Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of Order,
32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 247 (1998) (comparing American and Japanese prosecutors in their
emphasis on consistency). See generally Kay Levine & Malcolm Feeley, Prosecution, in
THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 12224
(2001) (comparing various countries on the degree of discretion possessed by individual
prosecutors in the bureaucracy).
43
See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals,
and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311
(1992); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1446 (1992).
44
See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper
Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 805–06 (2001) (describing
reasons for development of detailed guidance at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
45
Some state prosecutors’ offices, including a few described to us in the course of this
research, have crafted charging and sentencing grids to restrain individual prosecutors in
their charging and plea offers. But even in those offices, there is no parallel structure for
supervisors to review letters written to victims, much less to sign off on motions or
opposition briefs submitted to the court. That scarcity of oversight would be unheard of in
most law firms, who worry about the ways in which junior associates represent the firm’s
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of a junior attorney at a large law firm receives multiple internal reviews
before it goes out the door. 46 The bare-bones funding available for state
prosecutors and for their usual adversaries creates an environment different
from the large law firm or the administrative agency. The structural
features of criminal justice work make formal policies less frequent, and
less salient, for new prosecutors at the state level.
3. Organizational Shape and Hiring Preference as Office Structures
Given the scarcity of explicit instructions or direct oversight by the
Elected or her chief assistant, our concept of the third dimension of
prosecution must be more layered, accounting for unarticulated forces as
well as explicit office policies. 47 We could consider, among other things,
how the leadership articulates the organization’s priorities,48 the provision
of internal training opportunities, the size and diversity of the docket, the
supervisory structure, the typical progression (if any) of assignments in the
office, and the ways in which the physical layout divides or joins
employees. 49 While these are all rich topics, we highlight here 50 two
interests to outsiders. We suspect this is at least partly the result of caseload size. In many
firms, junior associates work on a handful of matters at any given time; in contrast, the junior
prosecutor is likely to have 75–100 cases on her desk.
46
Moreover, the lawyers in private law firms devote considerable energy to the salary
structures in the firm and insist on detailed and transparent monitoring and evaluation
systems for the work of each attorney on the payroll. See MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF
LAWYERS REVISITED: TRANSFORMATION AND RESILIENCE IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF
PRACTICE (2007) (comparing law firm cultures and emphasizing transparent compensation
structures as a key determinant of office values); Elizabeth Chambliss, Measuring Law Firm
Culture, 52 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 1 (2010).
The large size of the federal prosecutorial bureaucracy and the relative sophistication
and funding available to at least some federal defendants also help to explain why that
prosecutorial service is so different from the typical state prosecutor’s office and is subject to
more well-developed written policies. Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) also face
discipline from a well-developed monitoring and enforcement operation within the
Department of Justice. E-mail from Jennifer Collins, former AUSA, to Kay Levine &
Ronald Wright (Jan. 4, 2012, 4:51 PM EST) (on file with authors).
47
See Felkenes, supra note 39 (providing an anecdotal account of the socialization of
new prosecutors); Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, The Use and Transformation of
Formal Decision-Making Criteria: Sentencing Guidelines, Organizational Contexts, and
Case Processing Strategies, 45 SOC. PROBS. 248, 262–65 (1998).
48
See THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 25.
49
Thomas Winfree Jr. and his coauthors, in their study of the socialization of law student
interns in prosecutors’ offices, also examined structural aspects of the office, but they were
concerned with those features that affected the interns’ experiences, such as the appointment
of an intern supervisor and prosecutors’ willingness to give substantive assignments to law
students. See L. Thomas Winfree, Jr., et al., On Becoming a Prosecutor: Observations on
the Organizational Socialization of Law Interns, 11 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 207 (1984).
Those are not the features that concern us here.
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features whose relationship to professional identity may seem less obvious:
organizational shape and hiring preference.
Shape: The “organizational shape” variable refers to the division of
labor among line prosecutors in one office. It is customary in the legal and
sociological literature to treat hierarchical office structures and
specialization among attorneys as the environmental norm for criminal
prosecutors. 51 This Weberian version 52 of the prosecutor’s office is
overinclusive and leads us to ignore important differences among offices.
There are thousands of independent state prosecutors’ offices in the
country, most of which contain only a few prosecutors in addition to the
Elected. 53 Given their small size, the opportunities for hierarchical
supervision and specialization in most offices are severely limited. Even
among the midsize and larger prosecutor’s offices, we suspect one can find
meaningful variety in organizational shape because the shape of each office
reflects the unique combination of environmental forces and the personal
priorities of the Elected.
We see organizational shape as a variable that captures both the level
50

In the discussion that follows in Part III, we discuss some of these other architectural
features of each office as they become relevant.
51
See, e.g., DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN
JAPAN 119 (2002) (“On the surface, organizations of prosecutors in Japan and in America
may look much alike: they are bureaucratic; they distinguish between operator, manager, and
executive roles; . . . they promote workers on the basis of some combination of merit and
seniority . . .”); Jerald W. Cloyd, The Processing of Misdemeanor Drinking Drivers: The
Bureaucratization of the Arrest, Prosecution, and Plea Bargaining Situations, 56 SOC.
FORCES 385, 385 (1977) (observing, based on empirical research in San Diego, that
prosecution has become “immersed in large bureaucratic structures that emphasize
standardized procedures, specialization of activities, hierarchical decisionmaking, and the
sanctity of written reports and records”); Felkenes, supra note 39, at 115–16 (observing,
based on surveys of prosecutors in California and Alabama, that the “office of the
prosecuting attorney as an ideal bureaucratic structure is characterized by the hierarchy of
authority, the complete elimination of personalized relationships, the high degree of
specialization within the office, and the elimination of nonrational considerations such as
hostility, anxiety, and affectual involvements”). The only two contrary treatments we found
in the literature (that is, studies that acknowledge the existence of alternative shapes) are THE
CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 40–47, and Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 74–77.
52
See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 329–41
(A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947).
53
Among the 2,344 felony state prosecutors’ offices in existence in 2005, half served
jurisdictions containing fewer than 37,000 people, and more than 85% served populations of
250,000 or less, what researchers regard as a “small” jurisdiction. See PERRY, supra note 11,
at 2; Ronald F. Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 1515, 1523 (2011). Small offices typically have very small staffs; for example, in
2001, offices serving populations of 250,000 or less averaged only three assistant
prosecutors plus one elected DA. CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS 2 tbl.2 (2001).
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of supervision and the specialization of assignments in an office. 54 It runs
from the flat to the gently hierarchical to the steeply pyramidal. The flat
office is marked by egalitarianism and the absence of specialization among
the staff. 55 The line attorneys in a flat office are subordinate to the Elected
(and possibly to a chief assistant) but are essentially coequals to each other.
They do not work under midlevel supervisors; they do not jockey for
promotions because there are no promotional ladders for them to climb.
Where specialized units exist, they are nothing more than alternative
assignments, without conveying any sense of “moving up” in the office.
Any articulated office policies tend to apply to the entire office, rather than
to subgroups.
While egalitarianism and generalization are the hallmarks of the flat
office, pyramidal offices show high levels of hierarchy and specialization.56
When it comes to hierarchy among the prosecutors in such offices, the most
steeply pyramidal offices use several levels of supervision, including close
monitoring at the unit level and culminating with the Elected and his chief
assistant at the very top. The attorney assignments in the most pyramidal
offices also reinforce the hierarchy. Seriousness of crime and prestige of
assignment increase the higher up the pyramid one goes. Line attorneys at
the lowest level of the pyramid have the least experience in the office and
consequently receive the least desirable (and least risky) assignments; they
are subject to at least one level of review for decisions of any consequence.
Each attorney earns more plum jobs and more freedom from surveillance
through success in the office over time.
With regard to specialization, designated groups of prosecutors handle
certain types of cases (misdemeanors, drugs, and so forth) or certain phases
of the adjudicatory process (such as screening, preliminary hearings, and
trials). Specialization allows the attorneys to develop relationships with
defense attorneys and police who regularly handle those sorts of cases.
54
We do not believe that this property is an exclusive function of the office docket.
While offices with mixed (felony and misdemeanor) caseloads may be more inclined toward
hierarchy, offices with homogeneous caseloads might fall anywhere on the shape axis. That
is, an office that exclusively handles misdemeanors might be flat or might be hierarchical,
depending on the preference and leadership style of the Elected. See THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE,
supra note 16, at 39.
55
This is akin to the “clan” office described by Flemming and his colleagues and the
“unit” style office described by Mellon and his colleagues. THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra
note 16, at 45; Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 74.
56
This organizational configuration calls to mind Max Weber’s rational legal
bureaucratic structure, which emphasized “division of labor, centralized hierarchical
channels of communication and decisionmaking, impersonal utilitarian forms of interaction
and a generalized respect for records and record-keeping.” Cloyd, supra note 51, at 395
(referencing MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1922)).
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Moreover, team members can regularly share information about emerging
defense tactics, enabling them to create a shared strategic response.57 A
supervisor leads each group and develops group-specific policies to
supplement the office-wide policies. Team supervisors create a middle
level of management for the office,58 although in smaller offices the Elected
might personally supervise each of the specialty units.
We hypothesize that the differences in office shape one finds among
offices correlate with strikingly different professional identities and values
among prosecutors. An attorney working in an office subunit, distinguished
by attorneys with similar skills assigned to handle similar assignments, will
tend to look to her peers in that subunit, rather than to attorneys in other
units with distinct responsibilities, for advice and role models. Attorneys in
this setting will treat prosecution as an exercise of group wisdom.
Additionally, the prosecutor who is monitored by multiple levels of
supervisors, who enforce a combination of team-specific and office-wide
policies, is likely to be more comfortable with the burden of justification
and accountability (those who are uncomfortable with these restrictions will
likely seek work elsewhere). In contrast, an attorney who works in a flat
office is more likely to bristle at the possibility of horizontal and vertical
controls on the exercise of her individual judgment.
Hiring Preference: Turning to our second structural feature, an Elected
must choose a hiring strategy for the office to keep the staff at full
strength. 59 Those hiring preferences could be based on alumni networks
(e.g., for graduates of certain law schools) or on geography (e.g., for
lawyers who grew up within the jurisdiction). Here we focus on a
particular kind of preference, for experience—that is, for entry-level
applicants who possess prosecutorial experience at the time of hiring.
Electeds on one end of this axis prefer to hire experienced prosecutors
(veterans) whenever possible; Electeds on the other end recruit exclusively
from the ranks of recent law school graduates (newbies).
57

See Cloyd, supra note 51, at 395–96. Whether the creation of a specialized unit
actually affects filing decisions is up for debate. See, e.g., Beichner & Spohn, supra note 19,
at 490; Pyrooz et al., supra note 19, at 17.
58
There may even be multiple levels of supervisors, as Bruce Frederick and Dan Stemen
found in their study of the Midwestern County District Attorney’s Office. See BRUCE
FREDERICK & DAN STEMEN, THE ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL
DECISION-MAKING, FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 5 (Grant No.
2009-IJ-CX-0040 Sept. 2011) (describing an office with a three-tiered management system).
59
Of course, what type of attorney an office hires is not driven exclusively by office
policy. There is some self-selection bias involved in who applies for the job in the first
place. In the succeeding pages, we describe some aspects of this selection and the ways it
might limit the choices of an Elected when it comes to establishing the social architecture of
her office.
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There are costs associated with both approaches. Veterans command
larger salaries than newbies, but taking on newbies requires a commitment
to train them and to endure months or years of underdeveloped judgment.
There are also benefits associated with both approaches: veterans can “hit
the ground running” when it comes to case management and courtroom
technique, but newbies are easier to mold and may develop longer-term
loyalty to the office, regarding themselves as home-grown talent who
should repay the investment in their professional development. 60
We hypothesize that an office with a hiring preference for experience
is more likely to employ prosecutors who think of themselves as selfsufficient, who see relatively little reason to look to others in their current
office for guidance, and who are relatively reluctant to accept close
supervision from team leaders or others. Offices stocked with newbies are
more likely to employ prosecutors who are comfortable with, and perhaps
even comforted by, multiple levels of control over their decisionmaking
both horizontally (by peers) and vertically (by supervisors).
Putting the pieces together, the two structural options we have
described can be organized as in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Interaction of Office Shape and Hiring
Preference for Experience

In theory, an Elected might combine any particular point on the shape
axis with any given preference on the experience axis, although leadership
style, budgets, docket diversity, applicant-pool limitations, and other
practical restraints make some combinations more likely than others to arise
in certain places.
60

See DOUGLAS T. HALL, CAREERS IN ORGANIZATIONS 48 (1976) (noting that a person’s
career “stage” can influence his or her behavior at work; a professional in his first job “will
probably be concerned about advancement and establishing a reputation among colleagues,”
while an older person who started her career 20 years earlier is likely to have “quite a
different set of concerns”).
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For example, although the management style and personality of the
Elected in even the smallest office might add some pyramidal elements to
an otherwise flat structure, 61 we suspect there is some correlation between
large office size and pyramidal structure, even though the structure itself
performs the critical role in our theory. That is, given the inevitable
specialization and levels of supervision that large organizations tend to
require, 62 we predict that larger prosecutors’ offices in the United States
would be located in the upper half of Figure 1. 63 Varied dockets may also
push an office toward a more pyramidal shape. An Elected with
jurisdiction over both misdemeanors and felonies is more likely to require
some specialization among the staff attorneys, and diverse caseloads will
increase the benefits of specialized work and midlevel supervision to assure
quality control.64
There may also be a weak correlation between office shape and hiring
preference. For example, although some larger offices may have the funds
to hire the occasional expensive veteran to perform a specialized training or
supervisory role, we surmise that offices in the top right-hand corner of the
graph (pyramid plus a preference for hiring veterans into entry-level
positions) are few and far between at the state level. An Elected who hires
veterans into the bottom levels of a steeply pyramidal office can expect high
turnover. 65 Veterans are inclined to be “chiefs,” rather than “Indians,” to
borrow an impolitic analogy from one of our interviewees.66 For that
61

More active day-to-day supervision by the Elected in a smaller office, combined with
more stable assignments to specialty areas, could push a smaller office up into the midrange
of the pyramidal axis, even without a set of midlevel supervisors. THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE,
supra note 16, at 39 (noting that even smaller offices can possess bureaucratic features
because “bureaucracy evolve[s] out of political styles and their related policy needs as much
as from the problems associated with increasing size”).
62
See WEBER, supra note 52.
63
This is consistent with the findings of Flemming and his colleagues in THE CRAFT OF
JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 39 (“[T]he bigger offices . . . were centralized, hierarchical, and
formally supervised.”).
64
On the other hand, offices with less diverse dockets may need to adopt flatter shapes in
order to promote attorney job satisfaction, particularly if the Elected has a hiring preference
for experienced attorneys. See Nicholson, supra note 34, at 178–79 (explaining that
positions of high discretion keep employees from becoming unhappy and frustrated at work).
We thank Darryl Brown for this insight.
65
Given the pay and prestige associated with that position in a pyramid office, the job is
not particularly attractive to attorneys who have gained experience and salary elsewhere.
Even in the Manhattan DA’s office, regarded as one of the most prestigious state offices in
the country, David Heilbroner was nearly the only member of his 50-person cohort who had
taken the bar more than a few months before starting the job. See HEILBRONER, supra note
18, at 17.
66
Prosecutor 955. Trends at the federal level are of course completely different, given
the prestige of the office itself, the emphasis on hiring experienced attorneys to handle the
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reason, they may be more trouble than they are worth in organizations that
value close control and consistent outcomes.
Conversely, we believe that the features described in the lower-lefthand corner of the graph (flat shape plus a preference for newbies) are
commonly found in smaller rural prosecutors’ offices, 67 which tend to offer
lower pay and lighter caseloads than midsize or urban offices.68 New
lawyers with lesser financial needs can earn a decent living there while
gaining some experience. Professional growth potential is limited, though:
because rural jurisdictions have less varied and less serious crime than
urban areas, fewer specialized prosecutors are needed and direct oversight
by the Elected is common. 69 With no need for midlevel supervisors or
specialized units, the job becomes routine after a while for all but the most
senior members of the staff.
In sum, one previously understudied architectural feature that might
correlate with prosecutorial identity is the degree of hierarchy and
specialization, what we call the organizational shape. Likewise, the
tendency of an office to hire experienced prosecutors to fill entry-level staff
positions, referred to above as a hiring preference for experience, may also
affect or reinforce how prosecutors understand their professional roles.
Pyramidal offices with a hiring preference for newbies, we believe,
manifest an environment that encourages prosecutors to coordinate with one
another and to think of their work as a joint enterprise. In contrast,
relatively flat offices that recruit mostly veterans are likely to attract and
foster a greater sense of independence among the line staff. In the
following section, we describe our efforts to flesh out these insights through
the use of qualitative interview data.
federal docket, and the hierarchy structure imposed by the Department of Justice.
67
It might also be found in military prosecutorial organizations (the JAG Corps). As
described to us by a former Navy JAG officer, most of the trial attorneys in the unit were
newbies who would spend only two years in the office before moving on, while senior trial
counsel provided advice and assistance. Trial attorneys held substantial autonomy in case
management, although pretrial agreements had to be approved by the convening authority.
Interview with Mario Barnes, Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of
California at Irvine Law School, in Irvine, Cal. (Nov. 4, 2011).
68
See PERRY, supra note 11. Based on a nationwide dataset, the average budget of a
small office, defined as serving 250,000 people or fewer, is approximately one-third the size
of the average budget of a large office, defined as serving a population of 1 million or more.
Id. at 4 tbl.4. The caseload disparity is significantly greater: small offices annually close
about 3% of the number of felony and misdemeanor cases closed by a large office. Id. at 6
tbl.8 (reporting median figures). Of course, the median 141 prosecutors working in the large
office can handle far more cases than the median three attorneys working in the small office.
69
Many attorneys in our research sites indicated that they began their prosecutorial
careers in one of these flat rural offices yet chose to move to a more urban and diverse
environment after a couple of years to acquire more experience.

1142

KAY L. LEVINE & RONALD F. WRIGHT

[Vol. 102

III. RESEARCH DESIGN
We turn now to our preliminary empirical test of the variables that our
theory of the third dimension predicts will correlate with the formation of a
professional identity. In this section we describe the methodology of this
study. We also provide background information on our three research
locations and explain the shape and hiring preference characteristics of each
one.
A. METHODOLOGY
In an effort to study state prosecutors’ professional development, we
interviewed prosecutors in three offices in two metropolitan areas in the
Southeast during the 2010 calendar year. 70 The first office, the Metro
County District Attorney’s Office (Metro), handles all felony and
misdemeanor prosecutions for a major metropolitan area of more than one
million residents. The prosecutorial district includes major urban areas,
suburban municipalities, and rural areas. 71 Our two other offices are
situated in another major metropolitan area: one midway between the urban
center and the furthest reaches of the suburbs and the other a bit further
outside the urban center in the suburban ring. The Midway County
Solicitor General’s Office (Midway) prosecutes only misdemeanors, 72
while the Ring County District Attorney’s Office (Ring) handles only cases
filed as felonies. 73
We interviewed 121 attorneys in three offices, following a semistructured format that produced interviews lasting between sixty and ninety
minutes in a majority of cases. 74 Among the 11 narcotics prosecutors and
70

We are now expanding this research into other regions of the country to assess whether
the patterns we observed are generalizable beyond this region. Since this Article went into
production, we have completed approximately one hundred additional interviews at four
other offices, including two in the American Southwest.
71
Metro experienced rapid population growth in the first decade of this century, growing
32% during this time. Its population is roughly two-thirds Caucasian and one-third minority,
most of whom are African-American. The Metro County DA’s office employs roughly 80
attorneys who file approximately 10,000 felony and 50,000 misdemeanor cases each year.
72
The population in Midway in 2010 was about 700,000, with 54% African-American
and 5% Asian residents. The county grew about 4% between 2000 and 2010. The Midway
Solicitor General’s office employs approximately 15 full-time attorneys (as well as two or
three part-time attorneys); they file approximately 13,000 misdemeanor cases each year.
The Midway District Attorney’s Office files approximately 5,000 felony indictments and
accusations each year.
73
The population in Ring in 2010 was approximately 700,000, with 25% AfricanAmerican and 5% Asian residents. The population grew 13% between 2000 and 2010. The
Ring DA’s office employs approximately 35 attorneys and files between 4,500 and 5,000
indictments and accusations each year.
74
All of the interviews occurred in 2010. The shortest interview lasted less than thirty
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31 misdemeanor prosecutors whose interviews we analyze here, 26 worked
in Metro, 14 in Midway, and 2 in Ring. 75 Four of the prosecutors had
formal supervisory responsibility for other attorneys in the office. There
were 22 females and 11 persons of color among these prosecutors. 76
Our interviews covered many aspects of the prosecutors’ educational
and professional development. For example, we asked our respondents
about their reasons for becoming prosecutors, the influence of office
policies on their day-to-day work, and their future career plans. They
described their relationships with supervisors, peers, defense counsel, and
police, and discussed the relevance of law school, professional associations,
and mentors on their current professional lives. They discussed the tools
and skills needed to do the job well and their philosophies of prosecution. 77
We coded the transcripts to identify common themes in the responses of the
prosecutors and recurring patterns among subgroups. 78
This qualitative research method is well suited (and perhaps necessary)
to explore our hypothesis that a prosecutor’s professional identity mediates
between office structures and office outputs. While quantitative research
minutes; the longest covered more than four hours. For a discussion of the semi-structured
interview, a standard research method in the social sciences, see Beth L. Leech, Asking
Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews, 35 POL. SCI. & POL. 665 (2002).
Scholars recognize that interviews are a critical technique for grounded theory studies such
as this one. Normally at least twenty to thirty interviews are necessary for a scholar to
develop a reliable model or theory that can adequately characterize the findings. See, e.g.,
JOHN W. CRESWELL, QUALITATIVE INQUIRY AND RESEARCH DESIGN: CHOOSING AMONG FIVE
TRADITIONS 56 (1998).
75
Our method, like most qualitative work based on interviews, emphasizes depth over
numerosity in the dataset. See Zaloznaya, supra note 35, at 924. We recognize that two
employees from Ring is a very small number on which to base claims about that office.
However, because we are comparing structures, we were limited to practice groups that
could be found in more than one site. The only practice group in Ring that is duplicated in
Metro is the drug unit. We have been careful to check the sentiments about the office voiced
by our Ring drug unit attorneys against the comments of their colleagues in other units to
make sure that the drug unit attorneys are not idiosyncratic in their views of how the office
functions.
76
Midway employed a larger proportion of racial minorities than the other two offices: 7
of the 14 attorneys interviewed there were non-Caucasian; 6 of those 7 were AfricanAmerican, and 1 was of Asian descent. The 26 prosecutors in Metro were evenly divided
between males and females, while 9 prosecutors in Midway were women. The two Ring
attorneys in the drug unit were male. While we mention here the gender and race breakdown
of the offices, we did not find any salient differences in result based on either of these
variables.
77
Our semi-structured interview questionnaire is available upon request.
78
We used NVivo, a standard qualitative research software package, to facilitate this
sorting of interview statements into thematic categories. The software also facilitates word
frequency searches and similar exercises to isolate connections among interviewees. Each of
us coded some interviews conducted at each of the three offices.
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might capture something about office characteristics and case outcomes,
qualitative methods offer more insight about the connective tissue of
professional identity.
B. SHAPE AND HIRING PREFERENCE IN OUR RESEARCH SITES
Each of the three offices—Metro, Midway, and Ring—is characterized
by a particular combination of shape and hiring preference.79 Metro is
moderately pyramidal 80 in shape and mostly hires newly minted lawyers
right out of law school. New hires start off in the misdemeanor unit, first
doing bench trials before moving up to jury trials. 81 After about two years,
successful misdemeanor jury trial prosecutors graduate into one of three
different units: the narcotics unit, the crimes against property unit, or the
juvenile unit. Prosecutors stay in this second assignment for about eighteen
months; after that, they might make a lateral move to another second-stage
unit or they might move up to crimes against persons or the habitual felon
unit. 82 The homicide unit is regarded as the pinnacle assignment. A
supervisor runs each unit or “team” and generates team policies to
supplement office-wide standards. Team supervisors serve as both channel
and buffer between the levels; policies are communicated downward and
problems are communicated upward through the team leaders to the Elected
and the chief assistant, resulting in relatively little direct contact between
the Elected and his line staff. 83
Midway, which prosecutes only misdemeanors, is located on the lower
end of the shape axis and on the right end of the experience axis: all
employees are coequal misdemeanor trial lawyers and all are veterans at the
time of hiring. In fact, the Solicitor General of Midway likes to brag to
other officials that he has the most experienced misdemeanor staff in the
state. 84 There is one specialized unit for domestic violence, but the three
79

The description here offers a structural snapshot of each office as it operated in 2010
and does not account for organizational changes that have appeared since that time.
80
We call Metro “moderately pyramidal” because there is only one layer of supervision
between the line attorneys and the administration. Steeply pyramidal offices, such as the
Midwestern office studied by FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 58, boast multiple levels of
supervisors.
81
See Prosecutors 266, 272, 281.
82
See Prosecutors 110, 236, 239.
83
See Prosecutor 326 (when office adopts new policy, “usually, if – especially if it’s
team specific, [attorneys will] hear from their supervisor”; if an attorney objects to an office
policy, the Elected and chief assistant “hope the team supervisor can deal with it”).
84
See Prosecutor 910 (“I think the general consensus is [the Midway Solicitor] tends to
think that he needs to hire people with experience, like two years, three years, four years,
five years experience, and depending on who you talk to, it’s either so he doesn’t have to be
bothered with training them or answering a lot of stupid questions, or so he can go around
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attorneys in that unit hold those spots more or less on a permanent basis.
There is no midlevel supervision or policymaking. 85 The line staff bundle
together the chief assistant and the Elected as “the administration,” a unit
they consider a breed apart from the trial line.
Ring, which prosecutes only felonies, sits between the other two
offices on both dimensions. With regard to experience, most attorneys in
the office are hired from other prosecutors’ offices; Ring occasionally hires
newbies, but only those who were exceptional graduates of its internship
program. 86 With regard to structure, there are a handful of specialized
assignments (narcotics, white collar, and so forth), but they do not serve as
points of rotation or promotion. The people currently staffing those jobs
have held them for years, and expect to continue for years to come. 87 While
there are supervisors in charge of the specialized units and the line
attorneys, they don’t supervise their teams much at all: they assist new hires
with adjustment issues and serve as conduits for information from the
Elected or as backups in case of emergency. 88 In sum, Ring presents a
shallower pyramid shape than Metro does. Figure 2 captures the
differences among our research sites.
Figure 2
Shape and Experience in Three Offices

the state and talk about how he has the most experienced office.”).
85
See Prosecutor 900 (remarking that she runs the domestic violence unit, but because
that unit only handles a portion of the domestic violence cases that come into the office, its
policies apply to the whole office, not just to the unit).
86
See Prosecutor 775.
87
None of the felony trial attorneys expressed a desire to move into the specialized units,
although they deeply appreciate the work done by their colleagues in those units.
88
One nominal supervisor in Ring describes the assignment like this: “[O]ur supervisors
don’t supervise. I mean, they don’t sit and look over our shoulders. We’re professionals;
you should be doing your job. If they are in your office all that often, you’ve got bigger
problems than whatever they’re in your office about.” Prosecutor 785.
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Having articulated two properties of the state prosecutor’s office and
described their relevance to our three research locations, we turn in Part IV
to the connections we observed between these structural office features and
the professional identities of prosecutors who work there. We pay
particular attention to the prosecutor’s sense of autonomy as a
decisionmaker. In Part V we consider the second part of the theory: how
structural features, operating through the prism of self-identity, might affect
the prosecutor’s trade-off of values between consistency of decisions and
individualization of treatment, as well as other outputs.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE THIRD DIMENSION ON PROSECUTORS’ PROFESSIONAL
ORIENTATION
The structural variations among our research sites allow us to track the
correlation between organizational shape, hiring preference, and
prosecutors’ professional identities in two settings: misdemeanor units and
drug units. The moderately pyramid-shaped, newbie-oriented Metro office
has both a discrete misdemeanor unit (located at the bottom of the pyramid
and staffed mostly by newbies) and a discrete drug unit (located one level
up). Midway is a flat office that employs veterans to prosecute a steady diet
of misdemeanors, while Ring is a gently pyramidal, veteran-oriented felony
office that has a discrete drug unit. In the discussion that follows, we
compare comments of Metro misdemeanor prosecutors and felony drug
prosecutors with comments of Midway misdemeanor prosecutors and Ring
felony drug prosecutors.
These comments first reveal that a prosecutor’s tendency to think of
herself as either a member of an organization or an autonomous actor
correlates with structural conditions of her office, including shape and
hiring preference. A prosecutor’s orientation on the question of autonomy
also plays out in her relationships with teammates, supervisors, the whole
office, and the larger legal profession.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AUTONOMOUS OR TEAM SPIRIT
The sociology of organizations literature suggests that individuals
respond in predictable ways to socialization forces on the job. The three
most common responses are rebellion (rejecting all organizational norms
and values), creative individualism (accepting important norms and values
but rejecting the less crucial ones), and conformity (accepting
organizational norms and values uncritically).89 Our interviews with
89
See HALL, supra note 60, at 71. In this study, autonomous spirit correlates with
individualism or rebellion, while team orientation correlates with conformity.
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prosecutors reveal that an employee’s response to socialization forces is not
entirely a matter of individual choice. Instead, the office’s particular
combination of shape plus hiring preference correlates with the degree of
autonomy that the attorneys feel on both horizontal and vertical dimensions.
By horizontal autonomy, we mean the degree of independence each
prosecutor feels from his colleagues when it comes to making decisions on
his own cases. By vertical autonomy, we mean the degree of independence
each prosecutor feels from his boss (or supervisor) when it comes to
making decisions on his own cases. Prosecutors who work in hierarchical,
newbie-oriented offices will be inclined toward group values and low
measures of autonomy on both scales; they internalize the perspective
embedded in the Weberian bureaucratic model of the office90 and exhibit a
“custodial orientation” that prizes the organization’s current values.91 In
contrast, veteran attorneys in flatter offices exhibit high levels of horizontal
autonomy and at least moderate levels of vertical autonomy; they conceive
of themselves and each other as independent agents, more prone to
individualism and resistance. 92
Our three offices exemplify these tendencies. In both the misdemeanor
and drug unit context, Metro prosecutors see themselves as members of a
single organization unified by group values under the office leadership;
Ring and Midway prosecutors present as independent contractors who
happen to work in the same office. Metro prosecutors are less likely than
their counterparts in Ring and Midway to acknowledge or to approve of
resistance to office policies and are more deferential to supervisors. In
Metro, even the attorneys with more experience appear more amenable to
professional value formation from the leadership.
Turning now to specifics in our data, we begin with a thick description
of Metro, the office most inclined toward hierarchy and specialization,
staffed mostly by newbies. We then discuss the opposite extreme, Midway,
and save Ring for last, given its middle-of-the-road position on both
structural variables.
The team imagery emanating from Metro is palpable in the comments
90

See WEBER, supra note 52.
See Van Maanen & Schein, supra note 34, at 243 (opining that in organizations with
hierarchical boundaries and “sequential socialization” (the premise that an employee must
fulfill one role before passing to another), “custodial orientation” is more likely to result than
innovation because recruits remain locked into the conforming demands of others in the
organization for a long period of time).
92
See Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 75. A strong commitment to individualism may
not be endemic to this form, though. In the “clan” offices identified by Flemming and his
colleagues, which were similarly marked by a lack of oversight and few official policies,
attorneys worked with each other “horizontally” to “maintain some degree of consistency.”
THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 45.
91
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of our interviewees. Whether junior, midlevel, or senior, 93 male or female,
Caucasian or non-Caucasian, the Metro prosecutors referred to themselves
as members of teams and described their work lives and their social lives 94
as bound up with one another.95 They display very low levels of horizontal
autonomy in their professional decisionmaking.
The team identity is manifest in the physical movements of the normal
workday. The desks for all Metro misdemeanor attorneys are located in
cubicles (not separate offices) on a single floor in the District Attorney’s
Office. They spend most of each day together across the street in the
courthouse, coming and going at roughly the same time, while most felony
attorneys spend at least two weeks out of every three working on pretrial
matters in their own offices. 96 In addition, all of the Metro misdemeanor
attorneys start every workday together in one room, sorting files and going
over cases and current issues. They use these morning sessions to discuss,
question, confirm, and otherwise monitor each other’s decisions in
individual cases. A misdemeanor prosecutor explained the reason for these
discussions: “It’s important that teammates have faith in you. And that they
can know . . . you’re going to be in a position to do the work the correct
way and . . . make the right decisions.” 97
Beyond having faith in each other, team members hope to become
interchangeable with one another as a way to create stability and
93

Among the 26 prosecutors on the Misdemeanor and Drug Teams in Metro, 9 had less
than three years of experience in legal practice of any type at the time of the interview (our
designation for a “junior” prosecutor, based on common attrition rates in prosecutors’
offices), 10 had between three and four years of experience in practice (“midlevel”
prosecutors), and 7 had five years or more (“senior” level). Of those 7 senior attorneys in
Metro, 3 were supervisors. Among the attorneys in Midway, 2 were junior, 3 were midlevel,
and 9 were senior. The 2 Ring drug prosecutors were both senior.
94
The camaraderie that characterizes the work sphere in Metro spills over into the social
sphere. The misdemeanor lawyers get together at a local bar every Friday evening and often
see each other on weekends and holidays. Prosecutors 155, 191, 197, 308. There is an
annual team Christmas party hosted by the team supervisor, and the attorneys play softball
together outside of work. Prosecutors 272, 302. Similarly, the Drug Team lawyers describe
going to lunch together nearly every day and hanging out together after work; one even
commented that team members see each other more than they see their spouses, so it’s a
good thing they all get along. Prosecutor 251.
95
The peer group is commonly considered the employee’s main connection to the
organization; it can provide “emotional support, coaching, and identification models to help
the new recruit manage identity changes, difficult problems, and critical turning points.”
HALL, supra note 60, at 80 (citing Douglas T. Hall, The Impact of Peer Interaction During
an Academic Role Transition, 42 SOC. EDUC. 118 (1968), and Edgar H. Schein,
Organizational Socialization and the Profession of Management, 9 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 1
(1968)).
96
See Prosecutor 134 (describing trial week, administrative week, and weeks in office).
97
Prosecutor 170.
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consistency in busy courtrooms marked by frequent staffing changes. The
Misdemeanor Team is organized on a horizontal prosecution basis, such
that various attorneys will handle a single case at different stages of the
proceeding. 98 In addition to frequent prosecutor reassignments, there is no
established roster of judges who staff the misdemeanor courtrooms. Hence,
ensuring that every prosecutor on the team will handle the case in the same
way eliminates the risk of variation that might otherwise occur with judicial
rotation or prosecutor rotation.
I think we all kind of feed off one another and [want to know that] . . . every other
person would do [the same] in the same situation. If they were in our shoes, that they
would also try this case, that they would also offer this plea deal. . . . [T]here’s about
20 of us on the misdemeanor team—and we all, I think we could all change rooms, in
trial courtrooms, and all make the same decisions basically in the long run, and try the
99
case to the same degree and skill.

The interchange among the attorneys on the team, each of whom
brings a distinctive personal approach to the prosecutor’s work, also
expands the perspectives of everyone involved, creating a “think tank”
environment that “opens up a lot of thoughts . . . on how we should be
working as a DA.” 100
More formal mechanisms to promote consistency and discourage
horizontal autonomy operate in the Metro Drug Team. First, because drug
cases are handled horizontally, the team members “roundtable” every case
to make sure every prosecutor knows the relevant facts and criminal history
and could appear on any case if asked. 101 As one drug prosecutor reports,
98

Note that horizontal autonomy is a distinct concept from horizontal prosecution; the
former refers to a prosecutor’s sense of independence from his colleagues when it comes to
making decisions, while the latter refers to an office’s tendency to pass cases around
between prosecutors at various stages. For an explanation of the differences between
horizontal prosecution and vertical prosecution, see Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1134 n.18, 1153 n.79 (2005). The only units in Metro
organized on a horizontal prosecution basis are Misdemeanors and Drugs, both of which
exhibit low levels of horizontal autonomy. There may thus be an inverse correlation
between the level of horizontal autonomy prosecutors feel and the use of a horizontal
prosecution model in the unit.
99
Prosecutor 128.
100
Id. (“I think when you get so many different ideals in a room together, and people
start hashing out decisionmaking skills and why they are deciding on a case, you really get
great input on how these other people think and how they would have decided something.
Maybe [we] get the same conclusion, but [it is] done so in a different way to get there. And I
think for us, that really opens up a lot of thoughts and kind of ideas on how we should be
working as a DA.”); see also Prosecutor 251 (referring to Misdemeanor Team colleagues as
the relevant source of new ideas and perspective: “Pretty much anybody on the
Misdemeanor Team who I could talk to especially the first four months I was here, I wanted
to learn from as many people as people [sic], get as many perspectives as possible.”).
101
See Prosecutor 266.
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“what the higher ups want is consistency . . . they want each team to be
consistent among each other.” 102 The Drug Team also stresses the
importance of consistency by concentrating the “papering” decision (that is,
whether to file a case in the first place) in the hands of just three attorneys,
typically the most experienced on the team. 103 Lastly, the Drug Team
employs a detailed case-tracking computer program, giving the team
supervisor rich information about the choices made by each line attorney. 104
These combined techniques of team “self-monitoring” 105 make adherence to
group norms a salient goal for each individual on the team. 106
“Structured assistance” 107 for new prosecutors in Metro goes beyond
just team norms and expectations. Policies and rules, promulgated by the
team supervisors and the Elected, simultaneously discourage both
horizontal autonomy and vertical autonomy. For example, new Metro
prosecutors receive a forty-page manual, updated routinely, which sets forth
guidelines for misdemeanor court behavior and “defaults” for case
resolutions (that is, standard plea offers). 108 Within this diverse group of
office policies, a few amount to hard-and-fast rules, while others are more
tentative. Metro lawyers learn pretty quickly that there is no room for
discretion when it comes to the hard-and-fast rules (e.g., DUI “refusal”
cases must never be bargained down). 109 Deviation will yield a reprimand
and could ultimately lead to serious discipline, including loss of one’s job,
102

Prosecutor 161; see also Prosecutor 203 (“It’s very much a teamwork approach, we
make individual decisions but it’s very much, we try to be as consistent as we can.”);
Prosecutor 125 (“Talking with my supervisor and the senior members of the team, it does
change the decisions you make on the cases because you want to be consistent with everyone
else on the team.”).
103
Prosecutor 266.
104
Id.
105
Prosecutor 197. This sort of team self-monitoring differs from the tight top-down
control Utz found in the tightly pyramidal San Diego office. See UTZ, supra note 20, at 47.
This leads us to observe that hierarchical structure does not automatically generate
hierarchical control to the exclusion of other forms of control.
106
Deviation can be interpreted as a sign of laziness or lack of commitment, as
evidenced by this comment from a drug prosecutor, in response to a question about whose
opinion of his work matters: “My whole team. I want to know that I’m pulling my weight.
And, that if I am not, I want to be told, and if I’m not doing it the right way I want to be
told.” Prosecutor 110. This comment was echoed by misdemeanor Prosecutor 188, in
response to the same question: “My fellow ADAs, I really do care what they think because
so much of their job is wrapped up in mine . . . if I’m doing something that is making things
more difficult it makes their job hard . . . .”
107
See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 93 (1978). Heumann notes that “[s]ince
the newcomer’s actions reflect on the office as a whole, it is not surprising that this effort is
made.”
108
Prosecutor 272.
109
Id.

2012]

PROSECUTION IN 3-D

1151

although such punishment rarely becomes necessary. When it comes to the
looser rules, more flexibility is allowed as long as attorneys seek approval
from the team supervisor in advance or offer a persuasive explanation after
the fact. 110
Resistance to these policies is rare. When asked about employees’
reluctance to follow office policies, Metro prosecutors had a hard time
remembering any examples, and most opined that no one in the office
would disobey general policies or buck direct instructions. 111 They told us
that supervisors make themselves available to discuss employee questions
about office policies, but at the end of the day, policies stand and attorneys
must follow them out of respect for the organization. 112 As explained by
Prosecutor 302: “[W]hen you agree to work here, you agree to abide by the
policies. And if you don’t like the policies . . . then you should probably
seek employment elsewhere.”
Attorneys on the Misdemeanor and Drug Teams also respond
favorably to their supervisors because of their newbie status. As one
supervisor puts it, “[t]hey don’t have enough experience” to complain or to
be attached to old ways of doing things. 113 When Drug Team members
start to speak up regularly and to voice contrary opinions, the supervisor
tells them jokingly that it’s time for them to move out of her team and into
Crimes Against Persons, the next level up the pyramid. 114 Regular rotations
upward thus ensure a steady stream of new recruits into the team,
prosecutors who are excited to tackle a new challenge yet too naïve to resist
leadership.
Even though their autonomy is curbed by both team-level and officelevel structures, Metro prosecutors experience their office architecture as
promoting sound discretion and professional growth. They feel that their
supervisors trust them to develop and exercise judgment, and they generally
want to satisfy their bosses. One misdemeanor prosecutor observed fondly
that this was akin to a parent–child relationship, in which the line attorneys
110

Prosecutor 188 (“A lot of the rules you can depart from in your discretion. . . . You
better have a damn good reason, but you can.”).
111
Prosecutor 272 (“Very few folks coming into the office are going to say ‘I’m not
going to do it.’ Nobody’s going to say they’re not going to do it.”).
112
Prosecutor 239 (“Only thing I know is that outside the door, the door to this building
doesn’t have my name on it. It has his. . . . [You] make your arguments and you advise as
best as possible. But at a certain point, either I abide by the decisions that are made by a
person whose name is on the door, or I quit.”).
113
Interview with Supervising Attorney, Metro County, in Metro County (June 17,
2010); see also Prosecutor 128 (describing the role of inexperience in suppressing
independence and observing that “all the guys on the misdemeanor team feel young”).
114
Interview with Supervising Attorney, Metro County, in Metro County (June 17,
2010).
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want to please their supervisor. 115 Consistent with this portrayal, Metro line
prosecutors were genuine and lavish in their praise of their team leaders and
the Elected, whom most described as incredibly knowledgeable, “full of
integrity,” and “proud of the work we do.” 116
If the Metro pyramid office manifests a strong esprit de corps and a
high level of deference to respected authority, the opposite holds true in
flat-topped, experience-laden Midway.
The Midway misdemeanor
prosecutors regard themselves as independent contractors, each assigned a
private roster of cases to charge and resolve as she sees fit. 117 They also
express a strong sense of independence from their boss, whom they regard
as less experienced than themselves and detached from the day-to-day stress
of the office’s caseload. In this environment, expressions of team imagery
or deferential attitudes were few and far between.118
The lack of conformity does not mean that Midway attorneys are
alienated from each other. To the contrary, they regularly chat with their
colleagues about potential strategies and seek advice on thorny issues, and
many experience this regular contact as a sense of camaraderie.119 But
there is no framework, formal or otherwise, 120 for the constant checking and
cross-checking that goes on in Metro; self-monitoring by the office staff is
simply not part of the job. 121
There seem to be two factors, beyond the flat office structure, that
reinforce this heightened sense of horizontal autonomy at Midway: the
stability of courtroom assignments and the prior experience level of the
The Midway judicial center houses seven misdemeanor
staff. 122
115

Prosecutor 128.
See, e.g., Prosecutor 152.
117
This office resembles the “unit style” office described by Mellon et al., supra note 25,
at 74–77, and the reactive clan office described by THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at
45.
118
This finding proved equally true for attorneys of different races in the Midway office.
119
Prosecutor 915.
120
By some reports, there is an office manual for charging and bargaining that older
generations sometimes pass on to younger generations; it is not provided by the
administration at the time of hiring and no subject in Midway was able to locate his or her
copy when we asked. Even those who referred to the existence of the manual saw its terms
as provisional, at best. No one regarded it as anything other than a starting point for
prosecutorial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Prosecutor 905.
121
To borrow a phrase from Mellon, Jacoby, and Brewer, “there was little integration of
the staff into an ‘office’ . . . as each assistant operated his own policy-making unit.” Mellon
et al., supra note 25, at 75.
122
There is also less cohesiveness based on social life compared to Metro. The Midway
prosecutors tend to be older and subject to more family responsibilities than the Metro
prosecutors; they are eager to leave at the end of the workday to see their spouses and
children, and they are far more likely to attend family or neighborhood events on the
116
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courtrooms, each with its own permanently assigned judge. “Each
courtroom is its own universe,” says Prosecutor 930. Two prosecutors staff
each courtroom on a long-term basis, and they must learn and tolerate the
whims of their particular judge to succeed in that environment. These
regularly assigned prosecutors follow their judge’s lead more than the lead
of any colleagues in the office, treating consistency within each courtroom
as a higher priority than consistency between courtrooms. 123 Moreover,
because many prosecutors came to Midway from other jurisdictions, they
brought with them certain approaches (views of “what’s appropriate” 124)
that they learned elsewhere. For example, one prosecutor who previously
worked in another county in which banishment 125 was a common term of
probation imported that requirement into several of her plea deals in
Midway. While the defense attorneys complained about it, no one in the
Midway office told her she should not negotiate for such conditions. 126
More generally, experience in other systems gives the Midway prosecutors
a stabilizing sense of “the court system as a whole and a pragmatic model
of the professional prosecutor.” 127
Just as the stability of courtroom assignments and prior experience
render the Midway prosecutors horizontally independent of each other in
important ways, those factors also reinforce their sense of vertical
autonomy, or detachment from the administration. In contrast to the Metro
prosecutors, who spoke with admiration about their supervisors and the
Elected, our Midway subjects frequently commented on the inexperience of
the Solicitor General and his chief assistant. Before the election, neither
had prosecuted misdemeanors or supervised other prosecutors. 128 After
taking office, neither maintained an independent caseload or appeared in
court except in unusual circumstances. For this reason, the experienced line
attorneys tend to discount the administration’s policies and instructions. 129
weekends than to socialize with coworkers.
123
The lack of consistency between courtrooms with similar dockets led one of the
Midway prosecutors to refer to the courtrooms as casinos. Prosecutor 920.
124
Prosecutor 955.
125
This probation requirement prohibits the defendant from residing in the county during
the period of probation.
126
Prosecutor 945.
127
UTZ, supra note 20, at 105; see also THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 45
(describing the Elected of a reactive office as hiring people he trusted so that he would not
have to “look over their shoulders” and signaling to assistants “that they were on their
own”).
128
Prosecutor 965.
129
This situation embodies the bureaucratic dilemma of authority in the absence of
expertise, first highlighted by Talcott Parsons in the introduction to his translation of Max
Weber’s The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Talcott Parsons, Introduction:
The Institutionalization of Authority, to MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
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In the words of Prosecutor 960, “[t]hey are too far removed from the
gunfire . . . too comfortable in their offices with the air conditioning on” to
give advice that makes sense.
The line prosecutors’ experience of vertical autonomy also leads in
some situations to outright resistance of office leadership. As the Solicitor
General settled into his post during the year after his election, the Midway
line attorneys began to witness the slow encroachment of office policies
onto what was otherwise a wide-open landscape, characterized by the
original command, “Here are your cases, go forth and prosecute them.” 130
The Midway prosecutors experienced this gradual layering of office
policies as an unwelcome intrusion on their previously unlimited discretion.
As a result, resistance to these policies happens “all the time.” 131 As
Prosecutor 935 says, “There are a lot of rules, but people pick and choose
which ones to follow.” Nearly every person we interviewed in Midway
admitted not just to knowing about the resistance techniques of others, but
to personally using such techniques on a regular basis.132
Compounding the general disregard for these rules is the near absence
of consequence for violation. Despite frequent threats that disobedience
would lead to termination, not one subject could recall an attorney being
fired for insubordination and most commented that the administration
remained ignorant of all violations that did not produce publicity or defense
attorney complaints. Due to the absence of credible enforcement, there
appear to be no general policies that the Midway line attorneys uniformly
follow.
In sum, the Midway office is the antithesis of the Weberian
bureaucracy that scholars conventionally use to describe the prosecutor’s
office. This office instead presents an absence of hierarchy and
specialization, and its veteran attorneys manifest a high degree of
independence on both horizontal and vertical dimensions.133 Prosecutors
express a strong desire (and a high level of confidence in their ability) to
run their courtrooms without oversight from their officemates or boss.
Interventions from the administrators are seen as ill-advised, inspiring line
ORGANIZATION 59 n.4 (1947).
130
Prosecutor 950.
131
Prosecutor 920.
132
Sometimes the resistance is overt (e.g., flatly ignoring an office rule about issuing
witness subpoenas or doubling fines after appeal) and other times it is more hidden (e.g.,
using body language to signal to the judge and/or defense attorney the prosecutor’s
disagreement with the office plea offer, so as to provoke the judge to reject the deal), but
there is little doubt resistance is a regular feature of the office.
133
This level of autonomy may be tolerated due to the relatively low stakes in the
misdemeanor caseload and the relatively low visibility of the municipal court docket. See
UTZ, supra note 20, at 104 (describing low visibility decisionmaking in municipal court).
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attorneys’ frequent conversations “about how to get around protocols, in
order to make life workable.” 134
In Ring, experience blends with elements of a shallow pyramidal
structure to encourage a hybrid of autonomy and team spirit. The two drug
prosecutors in Ring occupy adjacent offices, yet they don’t refer to
themselves as a team. They function instead like tenants in common, each
managing his half of the caseload with a common goal in mind. Each has
specialized in drug cases for about a decade, and they are two of the most
experienced prosecutors in the Ring office. Both have a highly developed
base of knowledge and both serve as instructors to police and other
prosecutors regarding the law of search, seizure, and asset forfeiture. In this
two-person unit, one is officially the supervisor, but that supervisory status
makes no apparent difference in how the prosecutors relate to each other or
divide their work. 135
Although each Ring drug prosecutor is a self-sufficient senior attorney,
the degree of autonomy we witnessed in Midway does not manifest itself in
Ring, either horizontally or vertically.
Horizontally, a spirit of
collaboration exists within the drug unit, the result of a deliberate choice.
Years ago these two prosecutors decided that each should stay up-to-date on
what was happening in the other’s cases, enabling either of them to take
emergency phone calls from officers involved in clandestine
investigations. 136 Although they are not interchangeable to the same extent
as the Metro attorneys, the drug prosecutors in Ring realize that the unit
functions better if they share knowledge, and each treats the other as a
sounding board.
Vertically, the level of deference they exhibit toward the Elected is
more reminiscent of Metro than Midway, despite the boss’s lack of prior
experience as a felony prosecutor. The Ring drug prosecutors consistently
express deep respect for the DA’s position and for his hands-off approach
to the office caseload. For example, Prosecutor 785 says, “He’s a good
boss—he trusts us and leaves us alone.” Trust is essential because the core
component of the prosecutor’s job is discretion: “I can teach a chimpanzee
how to try a case. You’re paying me for my discretion. If you don’t trust

134
Prosecutor 950. Not one of our interviewees in Midway expressed any concern over
or disapproval for the widespread disrespect for authority in this office. Even the relatively
junior attorneys just seemed to accept that as part of the office culture.
135
To the extent that asymmetry exists in this unit, it seems to result from age disparity:
the younger of the two goes out more frequently on middle-of-the-night raids and brings the
older attorney up to speed on how to use technology for research and courtroom
presentations. Prosecutor 735.
136
Prosecutor 735.
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my discretion, then why hire me?” 137 For Prosecutor 735, prosecution is a
“structured business.” Individual prosecutors certainly have autonomy
within that structure, but they can’t “flaunt” it, because “ . . . you’ve got to
remember [that] you work for the guy whose name’s on the door, at the end
of the day . . . we’re soldiers in this army.” 138
The deferential posture slips a bit, though, when the Ring attorneys
discuss quality-of-life issues. Both men refer to their boss as a formal,
starched-shirt person who insists too strongly on dress codes and early
arrivals at the office every morning. 139 They describe his physical removal
from the rest of the prosecutors in an office “upstairs,” reaching out to them
mostly by e-mail. 140 But on the whole, they treat their boss’s formality and
remoteness as a sign of trust, not a management problem.
Reflecting on the comments of attorneys in all three offices about their
professional roles, it seems that autonomy has two dimensions, which we
might call objective and subjective. 141 Objectively, a prosecutor’s actual
level of autonomy is circumscribed by the structures imposed at both the
office and the team levels. Every office installs some of these basic
structures—wooden beams in our architectural metaphor—but some offices
supplement these basics with additional layers of review or protocols that
further restrict attorney movement inside the space. The number of these
objective constraints, however, does not alone determine how employees
understand their own independence on the job. Prosecutors instead
experience autonomy based on how salient these objective structures
become in their day-to-day lives. Moreover, the past experiences of an
attorney set her expectations for the appropriate level of autonomy
prosecutors should have. Thus, for some attorneys working in some places,
the architectural constraints become more visible, while for others they
recede from view and become less important.
137

Prosecutor 785.
Prosecutor 735.
139
The Elected seems to ignore the variety of roles line prosecutors must take on (e.g.,
dressing to execute a search warrant is not the same as dressing for a court appearance).
Their boss does not just swing by one’s office to chat, and he does not organize or explicitly
promote socializing among officemates. They attribute this level of formality and
remoteness to his rural background, his experience in the military, and his lack of personal
familiarity with the drug unit’s daily pressures (e.g., the midnight raids and the 24/7
availability to police).
140
The drug attorneys noted that they have more access to the DA than other assistants
due to his involvement in the multi-agency drug task force. Prosecutor 785.
141
See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 166–
72 (2008) (discussing objective and subjective views of prosecutorial discretion).
Additionally, autonomy (or discretion) might be exercised differently at different points in a
case; autonomy to file charges is not the same as autonomy to make plea offers or to offer
diversion, for example.
138
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In the Metro office, supervisors create team norms and habits that
constrain prosecutors in meaningful ways. Yet the newbie prosecutors feel
trusted and able to exercise discretion as they learn to develop professional
judgment. They feel that supervisors give them room to make mistakes and
give them input into office policies they don’t quite understand. Their
subjective perception suggests that the formal constraints, though
numerous, are not onerous. The Midway prosecutors objectively possess
far more discretion than the Metro prosecutors. There is no team
consultation built into the daily routine, no standard manual to follow, no
tradition of deference to the boss. But subjectively, they experience each
new office policy as an encroachment on their discretion, as a sign of
distrust in their abilities. The Ring prosecutors fall somewhere in between.
They acknowledge that they work for an Elected who makes the large
policy choices. Most of the time, though, this element of control is hidden;
they feel responsible for their own caseloads and expect the boss to contact
them only about unusual problems.
A prosecutor’s perception of her level of autonomy is not just
symbolic, and not just about handling cases. It can also shape how she
views her place in the larger office and in the legal profession more
generally. In the remaining subsections of Part IV, we examine the
connections between a prosecutor’s self-identity and these professional
relationships.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF CONNECTIONS TO THE LARGER OFFICE
The structural features we have identified, and the degree of autonomy
they suggest, can affect an attorney’s view of office functions beyond the
attorney’s immediate assignment. Pyramidal features in an office obscure
the vision of line prosecutors about how the office operates, due to the
barriers between levels. 142 Attorneys in flat offices, with no teams to speak
of and no midlevel supervisors between themselves and their Elected, have
better access to the overall workings of their offices. Moreover, the
prosecutor’s level of experience can exacerbate the insular or transparent
tendencies that the office shape creates. Unsophisticated staff members
tend to feel less confident than their more experienced colleagues when it
comes to questioning superiors’ decisionmaking.
The pyramidal shape of the Metro office, with its strong team
associations and team-specific supervisors at each level, creates solid
142

Van Maanen and Schein describe this phenomenon in organizations more generally.
They contend that the more “included” a person is in the organization, the more that person
will have access to organizational secrets, operational rhetoric (not just presentational
rhetoric), and unofficial yet recognized norms of the organization. See Van Maanen &
Schein, supra note 34, at 222.
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borders between hierarchical levels. While those borders generate powerful
team loyalty and affiliation, they also block the sight lines around the
office, preventing attorneys from getting a good look at the work of others
outside their team.
The Metro attorneys profiled here experience both physical and
psychological separation from colleagues working elsewhere in the office.
Physically, the misdemeanor attorneys are removed from the felony
attorneys both inside their own office space (creating a “huge separation”
between the two groups) 143 and in court, because misdemeanor attorneys
work in the district court while felony attorneys try cases in the superior
court. 144 The psychological distance is evident when misdemeanor
attorneys identify their teammates and their team supervisor as their sole
sources of information about the job. One prosecutor commented that, after
nine months on the job, he didn’t even know the name of anyone in the
office who was not one of his teammates! 145
This sense of separation is not unique to the misdemeanor crew. The
heavier workload for the Drug Team (compared to the other felony units)
prevents those attorneys from joining others for lunch or other group
activities. They might even overlook the relationship between the drug
docket and other felonies, a point brought home to one drug prosecutor
when she attended homicide bond hearings one day: “When you’re on your
team, you’re sucked into that world. All I deal with is drug stuff, so I kind
of forget [about] armed robberies.” 146
The team borders also shield the line attorneys from the Elected and
the world he inhabits. While the elected DA of Metro personally interviews
every new hire—in a session that leaves a profound imprint on most of
them, in terms of value transmission—he has only sporadic contact with his
line staff after that point. The attorneys feel his presence in the office
143
144

Prosecutor 185.
Prosecutor 236:

I think maybe when I move to another team, like I would kind of have a farther reaching
approach, like everybody knows district court is like a one to two year gig and everybody knows
once one to two years ends, you are going to move to another team. So it’s not like I feel stuck
there but you are just . . . you are really involved in your district, like we don’t really see other
people at the office, like we are almost always in court.
145
Prosecutor 185. Each new attorney arriving on the team is assigned a “trainer” for the
first few months in misdemeanor court, and that trainer often has only a few months more
experience than a newcomer. That trainer’s advice is formative—second only to that of the
team supervisor.
146
Prosecutor 165. The tendency towards introspection diminishes when prosecutors
mix with outsiders: one interviewee emphasized that when Metro prosecutors attend
statewide gatherings, attorneys from every branch of the office socialize together and are
remarkably cohesive. Prosecutor 272.
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through repetition of his mantra, “Do the right thing,” but they rarely see
him in court or in their offices. 147 New office-wide policies stem from
meetings between the Elected and the supervisors, and the supervisors
communicate those policies downward to their respective teams in later
team meetings. 148 Supervisors explain the policy, take questions, and
eventually assume enforcement responsibilities. Likewise, if a line attorney
has an issue, she will bring it to her supervisor, who will raise it with the
DA.
As a result of this buffer provided by the supervisors, Misdemeanor
and Drug Team attorneys in Metro believe that the Elected operates in
rarified air and is not connected to what they do on a daily basis. 149 He
deals with politics, the press, and other county officials. But their distance
from his handling of political issues seems to them a natural result of their
junior status; new prosecutors feel unqualified to question realms beyond
their experience. 150
As offices flatten out, the nearsightedness diminishes, at least on the
horizontal dimension; there are fewer obstacles between attorneys to block
one prosecutor’s view of what others are doing. In Midway, for example,
there are no definitional borders between line prosecutors. Each of them
plays on a level field with all the others—they all do essentially the same
job, just in different courtrooms. 151 Their offices are all located on the same
floor, albeit on opposite sides of the main elevator, and office assignments
appear to be random. There is no clustering based on seniority, courtroom
assignment, or any other variable. Due to the similarity in job descriptions
and close physical proximity, any attorney can consult with any other
attorney for advice on how to handle a case. One prosecutor mentioned that
he talks to whoever happens to be around at 4:30 on a Friday afternoon, 152
although most express preferences for a small number of confidantes.
Without midlevel supervisors to serve as buffers or conduits for
information, the role of the administration becomes more apparent to the
147
Appearances, when they happen, are memorable surprises. Prosecutor 152 (recalling
that when the Elected inquired about a new assignnment, the prosecutor reacted with
pleasure and surprise: “But I appreciate it. I was like, ‘Wow he knows what I’m doing.’”).
148
Prosecutor 164; Prosecutor 272.
149
Prosecutor 296 (“[A]t my level we’re kind of, kind of down the chain of command. I
don’t have a good idea a lot of times who’s making the decisions or where the
decisionmaking authority is for a certain policy, and so forth.”).
150
Prosecutor 188 put it like this: “I’ve been here less than a year. . . . I don’t feel like I
have the knowledge to tell a huge decision that affects the whole office, to be able to go and
say, ‘You shouldn’t be doing this because of this.’ I just don’t have the expertise yet.”
151
The only exceptions are the domestic violence attorneys and the one attorney who
drafts complaints for all in-custody defendants.
152
Prosecutor 915.
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staff attorneys. The Midway prosecutors see that their boss handles
political and press issues, corresponds regularly with the public defender’s
office and the local bench, and represents their office to county budget
committees. That is not to say they comprehend everything he does.
Certain decisions—such as hiring new attorneys—remain shrouded in
secrecy (much to the chagrin of the staff, who believe they should have
input). 153 More generally, the line prosecutors complain when they are the
last to learn about policy changes, particularly when outside sources inform
them about something that is about to happen in their own office.154 Unlike
their counterparts in Metro, who accept that there are larger issues in the
office about which they do not have enough knowledge to criticize their
boss, the Midway prosecutors resent being excluded.
The sense of removal, or “disconnect,”155 between the administration
and staff also derives from physical separation in the office space that the
Midway Elected created shortly after he became the Solicitor General. He
set the administrative offices apart from the line attorneys’ offices, and he
began to require line attorneys to schedule appointments with his secretary
to see him. Based on their level of experience and familiarity with the job,
the line attorneys in Midway regard these physical and temporal barriers as
signs of the Elected’s egotism, 156 not professionalism.
Ring, which contains some pyramid features superimposed on an
experienced staff, balances transparency and opacity at both the horizontal
and vertical levels. Horizontally, the line attorneys are experienced folks
who (with the exception of those assigned to specialized units) all do the
same job, albeit in different courtrooms. Their offices are spread over two
floors, and (again with the exception of the specialized units) office
assignments randomly mix prosecutors with different backgrounds,
experience levels, and courtroom assignments. This allows attorneys to
consult each other regularly for advice, although (as in Midway) each
attorney seems to have developed a small cadre of particularly trusted
associates.
Contrasting with the open environment of the general courtroom
attorneys, Ring’s specialized units have solid borders and resemble the
Metro teams in terms of their self-referential quality. 157 Members of a
specialized unit share the unit’s total caseload, but each manages a defined
portion of the cases. This arrangement gives them regular reasons to raise
153

See, e.g., Prosecutors 900, 910.
Prosecutor 930.
155
Prosecutor 905.
156
Prosecutors 910, 960.
157
They may be even more tightly controlled, given the long-term nature of the
specialized assignments in Ring compared to the rotational nature in Metro.
154
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case-specific questions with each other, both during informal hallway
conversations and in occasional unit meetings. While most unit attorneys
also consult non-unit prosecutors for strategic advice, the work performed
in each specialized unit remains somewhat hidden from the rest of the
office, due to the distinctive skills the unit attorneys develop.
Looking vertically, the line attorneys’ vision of the Ring Elected is
somewhat limited, although not to the same extent as in Metro. The Ring
supervisors shield the boss from the regular headaches of the trial line and
shield the trial line from the administrative or public relations concerns of
the boss. They meet periodically with the DA and interview prospective
new hires. The supervisors communicate office policies down to the line
attorneys and encourage their attorneys to approach them before the Elected
gets word of any problems. Several years ago, when the line attorneys were
ready to mutiny over the dress-code issue, supervisors arranged an officewide meeting and communicated these frustrations to the boss; when he
relented, they shared the good news with the staff. 158
However, in contrast to their Metro counterparts, the Ring supervisors
do not impose an additional layer of policymaking or guidance that the line
attorneys must follow. This sort of intervention is unnecessary, and would
likely be unwelcome, given the experienced nature of the trial attorneys in
the Ring DA’s office. 159
To sum up, the existence of intra-office borders—between teams and
between the line staff and the administration—can foster a sense of
nearsightedness that keeps the attorneys largely uninformed about their
coworkers. These internal divisions might appear natural and benign or
needless and insulting, depending on the experience level of the prosecutors
who notice them. The breadth of awareness of other attorneys in an office
helps determine the professional role models that a prosecutor chooses.
The transparency and perceived legitimacy of the leadership in the eyes of
line prosecutors influence whether the Elected and supervisors can shape
the professional identity of the staff attorneys.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE LARGER
LEGAL PROFESSION
Professionals who work in private organizations must show some
respect for their employers while remaining faithful to the external

158

Prosecutor 785.
Recall the comment: “We’re professionals; you should be doing your job. If [the
supervisors] are in your office all that often, you’ve got bigger problems than whatever
they’re in your office about.” Prosecutor 785.
159
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standards and traditions of their professions. 160 This problem of competing
loyalties exists in the field of criminal justice, too: an attorney in a
prosecutor’s office assumes the dual roles of employee and member of a
larger profession, a duality that can influence both how she thinks of herself
and how she exercises discretion in particular cases. 161 Moreover, the
structures in a prosecutor’s home office can create either fertile or rocky
soil for professional values to bloom. In some offices, the line prosecutors
identify with attorneys who work elsewhere; in others, prosecutors think of
themselves as members of a distinct profession, with no salient professional
ties elsewhere in the legal field.
The team orientation of the Metro misdemeanor attorneys—reinforced
by solid borders within the office hierarchy—keeps prosecutors attuned to
the views of their peers within the same unit, but it also leads them to show
less interest in the views of legal professionals outside their office, whether
they be prosecutors from other offices, defense lawyers practicing in the
county’s criminal courts, or other members of the legal profession.
Prosecutors in Midway and Ring, by contrast, more frequently cultivate
professional ties with prosecutors in other offices, and they value outsider
opinions about practicing in the criminal courts. The prior experiences and
autonomous outlook of prosecutors in Midway and Ring lead them to
identify more strongly with the prosecutorial profession as a whole.
1. Prosecutors Elsewhere
Members of the same profession typically share common training and
values, allowing them to identify with other professionals even when they
work in different organizations. Defense attorneys, for instance, often build
their professional identities around role models who are found outside their
own offices. 162 The development of ties between prosecutors in different
160
See CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 44–46 (3d ed.
1986) (describing the dual focus of scientists who hold jobs in bureaucratic organizations
compared to those who hold academic positions at universities).
161
See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 361–62
(1953).

A profession presupposes individuals free to pursue a learned art so as to make for the highest
development of human powers. The individual servant of a government exercising, under
supervision of his official superiors, a calling managed by a government bureau can be no
substitute for the scientist, the philosopher, the teacher, each freely applying his chosen field of
learning and exercising his inventive faculties and trained imagination in his own way, not as a
subordinate in an administrative hierarchy, not as a hired seeker for what he is told to find by his
superiors, but as a free seeker for the truth for its own sake, impelled by the spirit of public
service inculcated in his profession.

Id.

162

See Etienne, supra note 35, at 1209.
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offices, however, seems to vary with the social architecture of their own
offices.
Hiring preference for experience seems particularly salient in this
regard. Few Metro prosecutors had prosecution experience before taking
their current job, 163 while eleven of sixteen Ring and Midway prosecutors
previously worked full-time in another prosecutor’s office. 164 Based on this
history, prosecutors in Midway and Ring tended to invoke experiences in
other offices when reflecting on their current status; reflections of this sort
were a rarity in our interviews with Metro prosecutors.
Some Ring and Midway prosecutors fondly spoke of mentors in other
offices who contributed to their professional skills. One misdemeanor
prosecutor in Midway said:
It wasn’t uncommon for us to be in trial and he would just be whispering in your ear,
telling you what to do, and honestly . . . that’s where my training came from. Because
he knew his stuff, he knew his law, and he was always there telling you, even if you
didn’t want to be told. 165

Likewise, Prosecutor 735, who worked in three offices before coming
to Ring, told several stories about the first lawyers who trained him, noting
that their professionalism and “zeal” for the job made him want to be a
career prosecutor:
I mean these guys all were career prosecutors and they were my mentors. And I felt
that because they did it, they never made a lot of money, they never dressed well, and
they drove old cars. I admired their career . . . and I sort of subconsciously emulated
166
it.
163

Of the twenty-six Metro prosecutors working in the Misdemeanor and Drug Teams,
only four previously had been employed full-time at another prosecutor’s office. Another
twelve interned with a prosecutor’s office during law school before taking the full-time job
in Metro.
164
For all but one of these remaining five, the job in the prosecutor’s office was not the
first job out of law school. Most had worked elsewhere in government (e.g., a public
defender’s office, a state agency, a state judge’s chambers), and one had been a private
defense attorney for more than 10 years.
165
Prosecutor 900; see also Prosecutor 910 (“[T]hey ran a very clean and tight ship down
there [in the office where I interned]. It was very fair, . . . everyone treated everyone else the
same way.”); Prosecutor 925 (“Traffic court was . . . the time I was there was a time of
transition, so it was a whole lot going on and my boss there was more concerned about me
getting the experience I needed, versus anything else. You know, he would come to me with
a trial.”).
166
Consider these additional comments:
These guys were ADAs when I was there and they’re legends, you know, but they came to you
and you could go to them, and they always had the time to talk to you and help you. . . . That
was always nice, that some of the guys, you know, had they been rude, had they been pricks to
me, I don’t know if I ever would have stayed in the game.

Prosecutor 735.
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Aside from recalling specific role models, Ring and Midway attorneys
offered comments about the organizational features of their prior offices
that affected their work lives. For example, a few recalled bosses from
other offices who drafted all of the accusations, an approach that reduced
the line prosecutor’s level of discretion167 but also freed up time for the line
prosecutor to focus on preparing her cases for trial.168 Whether they
evaluate their prior offices in a positive or negative light (or some mixture
of the two), 169 the point is that Midway and Ring attorneys generally have
experience with prosecutors elsewhere, and this experience informs their
perspectives on the contours and possibilities of the prosecutor’s role.
Beyond the office’s approach to hiring, aspects of the larger
institutional environment can influence a prosecutor’s connection to
prosecutors elsewhere. For example, consider the effect of bifurcation of
the prosecution function. Midway County and Ring County each have two
prosecutorial offices led by different elected officials: one for felonies and
one for misdemeanors. In contrast, a unitary Metro prosecutor’s office
handles all felonies and misdemeanors for the jurisdiction. The bifurcated
approach seems to facilitate and inspire more awareness of and respect for
prosecutors in other offices, because the felony office sometimes hires
directly from the misdemeanor office. Misdemeanor attorneys who want to
make the leap upwards therefore need to develop a reputation with assistant
district attorneys they meet in the courthouse, while assistant district
attorneys need to stay aware of the up-and-comers in the misdemeanor
office. In a unitary system, there are no other local-area state prosecutors
whom one should either impress or learn about.
This structural arrangement also produces a disparity in office size.
Unitary offices may be significantly larger than bifurcated offices because
they need to handle both portions of the criminal caseload. Size is regarded
as a significant benefit in Metro, as prosecutors there were inclined to think
of themselves as a resource for other, smaller offices, not as a recipient of
services. But the suggestion that size equals professional prowess is not
supported by our data from Ring. The Ring DA’s office has a very strong
reputation, even though it is not the largest district attorney’s office in the
state. For example, Ring attorneys are often asked to teach at statewide
seminars and to lead workshops for prosecutors, and attorneys across the
167

Prosecutor 905 (“[T]here were certainly standards there because they were all his
standards.”).
168
Prosecutor 960.
169
See, e.g., Prosecutor 955 (“I think that at X county, we had a number of policies and
things we could do, and things we couldn’t do. . . . [W]e had more layers of supervision
there, so they communicated verbally a lot more. I think, quite frankly . . . we probably
feared [the District Attorney of X County] more than we fear [the Solicitor General here].”).
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state flood the office with resumes when openings are posted on the
statewide website. Yet Ring attorneys see value in developing cross-county
relationships and in asking for advice from prosecutors elsewhere. 170
Metro prosecutors also correlated size with discretion, opining that
they are permitted to exercise judgment more frequently than their
counterparts in smaller jurisdictions. One attorney summed up the
relationship between size and judgment like this:
[We] are the largest office in [the state], and in smaller counties . . . you have fewer
cases, so the DA could make a decision about every speeding ticket that is over 95
miles an hour, because there just are not that many. . . . Here we are just too big to do
171
that.

This correlation between size and discretion does not hold across
jurisdictions, though, as other research reveals large offices that impose
much tighter controls on individual decisionmaking than is characteristic of
Metro. 172
The divergent views in the three offices about the relevance of
prosecutors elsewhere cannot easily be attributed to disparities in outside
training opportunities. 173 For example, all three offices operate in states
where there is one annual, statewide conference for prosecutors. Most
prosecutors report that they attend this conference, 174 and most of the
regular attendees report that they receive valuable instruction, insight, or
rejuvenation from these meetings. But whereas the Metro attorneys who
attend this conference form their own social group and don’t mingle with
outsiders, 175 Ring and Midway prosecutors report that they swap war stories
during the conference with attorneys from other regions. Moreover, several
of the Ring prosecutors regularly teach at these statewide conferences (and
at the national boot camp for prosecutors in South Carolina). They
therefore remain abreast of the good work done by prosecutors in other
offices and express willingness to call on outsiders to serve as resources in
170

Prosecutor 735.
Prosecutor 272; see also Prosecutor 173; Prosecutor 197 (“[W]e have an amazing
amount of discretion and there just really are not those rules.”).
172
See FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 58. Our preliminary data from a Southwestern
state are in accord.
173
In all three offices, internal training opportunities were too sparse or infrequent to
make an impression on any of our respondents. However, we suspect that in offices with
meaningful internal training programs, this would be an important component of the office’s
social architecture.
174
Midway, in fact, organized the first-ever solicitor general’s conference in the state the
year before these interviews were conducted. This conference was the brainchild of the
Elected, as part of an effort to assume a leadership position among other solicitors general in
the state.
175
Prosecutor 272.
171
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difficult or novel cases. 176
2. Other Attorneys
While interviewees in our three offices differed regarding their
knowledge about outside prosecutors, they all took a similar posture toward
defense attorneys who practice alongside them and toward civil litigators
and transactional attorneys. For prosecutors in each of the offices, defense
attorneys help define their professional roles through either negative
example or cooperation in moving cases along. Civil attorneys exert next to
zero influence on the work or professional identities of prosecutors.
At first blush, prosecutors in Metro, Midway, and Ring seem to
minimize the importance of the defense bar’s opinion about the quality of
their work, saying that “[they] don’t think it matters as much” as the
opinion of judges or other prosecutors. 177 In fact, the training for Metro
newcomers emphasizes that the good opinion of defense attorneys is not
necessary for professional self-esteem. 178
Yet most prosecutors admit that they want defense attorneys to see
them as fair and prepared, rather than as aggressive or game-oriented.
“[W]hen they have a case with me I want them to, and I think I do have this
reputation, that [I’m] going to be fair. ‘He’s going to fight, but he’s going
The emphasis on being perceived as fair and
to be fair.’” 179
“straightforward” 180 is partly a matter of ethics (in the words of Prosecutor
735, “at the end of the day we’re all lawyers and we all should have the
same ethics in the profession”), and partly a matter of common sense,
because the caseload will not move otherwise. “You get along with them
so you can kind of get what you need and they do the same.” 181
As predicted by the literature on criminal court working groups, 182
176
Ring Prosecutor 735, for example, said if he were facing a difficult issue he wouldn’t
hesitate to call the Prosecuting Attorney’s Council, the statewide professional organization
for prosecutors, to get advice.
177
Prosecutor 182; see also Prosecutor 152 (keeping defense at arms’ distance). In
accord, in response to the question whether “the opinion of defense attorneys matter[s] to
you,” Prosecutor 128 said: “For me, no. They might get mad or they might get angry, but it
doesn’t bother me.”
178
Prosecutor 272. Similarly, in Midway, prosecutors tend to say that “the more
comfortable I became with myself and the more I knew myself, the more I was okay with
being, ‘Take it or leave it. We could try it, I don’t care.’” Prosecutor 960.
179
Prosecutor 955; see also Prosecutor 152 (“I’m well respected. I guess the way that—I
do care in a sense the way that they perceive me. A lot of them perceive me as being fair.
And that’s what I’ve always wanted.”).
180
Prosecutor 965.
181
Prosecutor 287.
182
See JAMES EISENSTEIN, ROY B. FLEMMING & PETER F. NARDULLI, THE CONTOURS OF
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prosecutors in all the jurisdictions place more stock in the opinion of
defense attorneys who are repeat players in the local courts. They attribute
the most extreme and unwelcome forms of adversarial behavior to
“outsiders”—those defense attorneys who normally pursue a civil litigation
practice, are new to the practice, or are not familiar with the jurisdiction. 183
Prosecutors also generally distinguish between attorneys they respect and
other defense attorneys: only the opinions of the former carry any weight.
As one Midway attorney put it, “There are the defense attorneys that I think
are idiots. I could care less whether they think I’m working hard or what,
because I know what people are saying about them.” 184
Prosecutors in all three counties also share the sense that they have a
responsibility to keep defense attorneys within the bounds of acceptable
courtroom behavior. 185 Prosecutors see the need for “education” as
especially pronounced for defense attorneys who are new to the profession
and to the jurisdiction:
[We] know that we’re going to have to mold [the new defender in the courtroom]
because he’s going to come in here, he’s going to be a firecracker, he’s going to want
to try everything. . . . [There] are just certain things that we’re kind of like, “Okay, if

JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS 19–39 (1988) (describing the components of the
courthouse community); EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 8; see also UTZ, supra note 20, at
95 (describing the system in Alameda County where, because DAs and public defenders are
permanently assigned to courtrooms, “they get to know each other [and] the judge . . . and
learn what to expect as they work together” and observing that in this environment,
“[f]ormalism, partisanship and ‘unreasonable’ claims tend to be discouraged . . .”).
183
See, e.g., Prosecutor 910; Prosecutor 182 (“[T]here’s a lot of solo practitioners out
there who are just figuring out things as they go along, which can make it a little difficult for
prosecutors in the courtroom.”). This is consistent with the literature about courtroom
working groups. See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 58–61 (distinguishing cooperative defense attorneys who are
experienced enough to know that most cases need to be plea bargained and those
inexperienced or uncooperative attorneys who slow things down by being excessively
adversarial).
Some prosecutors observe that many defense attorneys qualify as insiders because of
professional ties that go back as far as law school: “You know, a lot of us went to law school
together, a lot of us started practicing law around the same time and you know, so if I wanted
the defense attorney to say, ‘Hey, you know, she’s a good attorney,’ it’s only because that
means we have that mutual respect for each other.” Prosecutor 925. See also comments by
Prosecutor 955 that he has a number of friends in the defense bar and thus tries “to keep
work at work and outside work outside work.”
184
Prosecutor 905; see also Prosecutor 197; Prosecutor 236.
185
Prosecutor 287. A drug prosecutor in Ring (Prosecutor 785) noted that office policy
requires a prosecuting attorney to attend every meeting between the police and a potential
cooperating witness if the witness is represented by counsel because the defense attorney
might “take advantage” of the officer and extract a promise that the officer has no authority
to make.
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186

Across all three jurisdictions, prosecutors expressed a sense of
responsibility to shape defense attorneys’ conduct, much as they might feel
obliged to train new attorneys in their own offices. 187
In contrast to the defense bar regulars, civil attorneys exercise little
influence in prosecutors’ minds. The attorneys in Metro express frustration
about the expensive dues they must pay to the county bar association, which
offers no programming or services that they find relevant.188 Midway
attorneys asserted that after court responsibilities, meetings with victims,
and stacks of cases to charge, they had little time left over to attend
lunchtime Bar meetings (even if they wanted to).189 Similarly, Ring
attorneys express no interest in meeting civil attorneys. Because the civil
and criminal bar “don’t really cross that much,” prosecutors never practice
against those attorneys and have no motivation to attend meetings or
otherwise to connect with the broader bar. 190 To be sure, attorneys newer to

186

Prosecutor 965. She additionally commented, “[H]e’s a rookie and he’s just enjoying
himself in court at our expense. We’re like, ‘It’s 4:30—are you still arguing?’” This is
consistent with the legal environment observed by Pamela Utz in California, where “the
failure of negotiation is ordinarily more attributable to unreasonable, often inexperienced
defense attorneys than to excessive prosecutorial demands.” UTZ, supra note 20, at 117.
187
See Prosecutor 900 (“When you’re new, as an attorney, because we are in an
adversarial system, you think that you’re supposed to be mean and come with an attitude and
come with, you know, this ‘I’m not going to agree with you,’ and that is totally the
opposite. . . . We teach them . . . I talk to them first and then if they don’t get it, I take them
to trial and as I say, I beat up on them, I show them.”). When pressed, she admitted that
“newer prosecutors, they probably come the same way, quite honestly.” Id. A similar point
of view about new prosecutors was expressed in the other counties too. See Midway
Prosecutor 735 (“A lot of young prosecutors, and a lot of young defense lawyers, they really
get ‘it’s us against them’ mentality, and I don’t think that’s healthy for our profession. I
think we need to be able to respect each other.”); Metro Prosecutor 287 (“I think a lot of
people, particularly younger people when they start right in the DA’s office, they want to,
they’re all fired up and they just think that, go to the wall with these people and you’re going
to fight with them and hate each other. That’s not the way it is.”).
188
Prosecutor 239:
Our interest, our mission, our charge is a lot different and very distinct from what everyone else
does. It’s kind of a small anecdote, but we had the [Metro] County Bar meeting the other day,
and [Metro] County raised its bar dues from $150 to $225. And compare that with bar dues in
every other county. This is ridiculous anyway, $150, but to raise it even more? And we had
probably four-fifths the office out there, just voting against it and being pretty vocal about it.
And just effortlessly most of the members of the private bar just go like, whatever. . . . It’s just
so different that I have absolutely nothing—I have very little in common with most members of
the County bar.
189

See, e.g., Prosecutor 960.
Prosecutor 735. This prosecutor further noted that he did attend bar meetings and
network with civil attorney colleagues earlier in his career when he was in civil practice.
190
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the profession maintain social ties with friends from law school, 191 and
more experienced prosecutors know lawyers from previous jobs who now
practice outside the criminal courts. In both cases, though, their opinions
are rarely relevant to prosecutors as they think about how to do their jobs.
3. Accounting for the Disparity
Why do our respondents from different offices seem consistent in their
attitudes toward defense attorneys and other members of the bar but vary in
their attitudes toward outside prosecutors? As the courtroom working
group literature suggests, the presence of repeat players is one key variable
in prosecutors’ relationships with other attorneys. 192 Contacts with civil
attorneys are just too infrequent to make a difference, and this holds across
jurisdictions. As for prosecutorial perspectives on the criminal defense bar,
the comments of prosecutors focused on courtroom behavior of the
advocates, an environment in which variations in prosecutor office structure
may exert less influence. Nonetheless, structural choices—particularly
stability of assignments 193—may play some role in generating variation
between offices. Permanent courtroom assignments lead prosecutors to
develop stronger relationships with defense attorneys they see every day;
rotating assignments do not foster these sorts of connections. Looking
outside the boundaries of the office itself, the structure of the jurisdiction’s
defense bar would affect how often even permanently assigned courtroom
prosecutors encounter specific defense attorneys. 194
When it comes to building ties with prosecutors from other
jurisdictions, the training practices of the office can drive or limit the
opportunities for junior prosecutors to meet their colleagues from other
offices, on both a state and a national basis. Offices that sponsor mostly inhouse trainings limit these opportunities, while offices that regularly send
191

Prosecutor 155 said, “I have friends that I went to law school with, that I interact
with. But they don’t know—if you file liens for construction workers on property, we’re not
going to come into contact with each other probably.” In contrast, Prosecutor 735 was
unusual in stating that he would call “friends outside the prosecution game” for advice
because he trusts their judgment and sometimes doesn’t want people in the office to know
that he’s struggling with an issue.
192
See Skolnick, supra note 183. Where prosecutors encounter other attorneys on a
routine basis, they are more likely to make distinctions within the group and to account for
and value the opinion of some repeat players as they make charging and disposition choices.
193
Stability of courtroom assignments is not inherently related to either shape or hiring
preference; it is a distinct feature of an office’s social architecture. Future work should
investigate the independent relationship, if any, between this architectural choice and
professional identity.
194
See generally UTZ, supra note 20 (finding that the poorly organized defense bar in
San Diego was unable to exert significant pressure on the district attorney’s office).
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their attorneys to large gatherings promote the development of professional
networks. Additionally, if the leadership in the office periodically mentions
practices in other jurisdictions as relevant to addressing similar problems at
home, connections to other prosecutors become more salient for everyone
in the office.
V. EFFECTS OF THE THIRD DIMENSION ON OFFICE OUTPUTS
The previous section used qualitative data from our research sites to
offer preliminary support for the first part of our central claim: that the
social architecture of a prosecutor’s office can leave its mark on the
professional identities of attorneys who work there. We turn now to the
second part of our theory, asking whether this identity, in turn, has the
capacity to influence the results that an individual attorney will obtain in
criminal cases and, by extension, the results that the entire office will
achieve in the criminal docket for the jurisdiction. In Subpart A, we
address this question by focusing on consistency in handling cases. We
discuss what prosecutors in our research sites say about the importance of
consistency in their offices, and then describe the limitations of this study
when it comes to assessing data on this question. In Subpart B, we turn to
other outputs that might bear the imprint of an office’s social architecture
and the professional identities of the attorneys who work there, including
career vision, relationships with police, and a “culture of mercy.”
A. CONSISTENCY IN CASE HANDLING
The public expects the professionals who work in American criminal
justice to pursue two contradictory aims: to treat in the same way every
person who commits the same crime and to treat each suspect and each
defendant as an individual. 195 These paradoxical expectations—treat every
person the same, except for those who should be treated differently—also
shape our views about prosecutorial discretion. 196 Not surprisingly, then,
195
These twin impulses lead us to ask police officers to bring a sense of proportion to
their work and to decline to arrest some suspects, even if probable cause would support
charges, without showing favoritism. See DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE
POLICE 135–41 (2008). Similarly, we ask sentencing judges to avoid “disparity” in
sentences, but only if that disparity is “unwarranted” in light of the individual circumstances
of the case. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 121–26 (1998).
196
See Felkenes, supra note 39, at 99 (“The work environment of the prosecutor places
on him demands that are often ambiguous and conflicting. The strains of maintaining public
support and acting effectively in prosecuting suspects make this highly visible government
position vulnerable to numerous compromises.”). We note that in the Vera Institute study of
two prosecutors’ offices (Midwestern and Southeastern), prosecutors offered a mixed
portrayal of the value of consistency. While in surveys they regularly highlighted the value
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one theme that arose during our interviews was the need for consistency
among different prosecutors who work in the same office. 197
While interviewees in all of our research locations raised this point,
some attorneys gave a higher priority to consistency than others, and this
variation seemed to correlate with their office environments. 198 Line
prosecutors in Metro, an office whose structures promote a strong team
spirit, explained that they encourage each other to produce consistent
outcomes in the cases they each handle. 199 Conversely, prosecutors in our
flat office stocked with veterans (Midway) placed value on individualized
outcomes rather than on consistency. Ring prosecutors fell somewhere in
between.
This correlation between social architecture and consistency is not
surprising. In offices where attorneys conceive of themselves as team
members who can substitute for each other whenever the need arises, the
desire for interchangeable results is understandable. 200 Offices that foster
autonomy are less likely to place a premium on consistency of outcomes for
several reasons. First, a prosecutor who is not subject to regular crosschecking by teammates or monitoring by a supervisor can reach her own
conclusions about what is appropriate in her caseload, without having to
account for her decisions to anyone other than the judge in the courtroom.
Second, if she seeks advice about her cases, the absence of intra-office
borders allows her to collect multiple and diverse opinions. Through these
contacts, she is likely to hear multiple different approaches from many
people. Third, an office that tends to hire veteran prosecutors increases the
of consistency across cases, in focus groups they acknowledged that competing values and
limited resources often make consistency hard to achieve. FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note
58, at 9.
197
Cf. Michael Tonry, Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV.
37 (2005) (treating consistency of outcomes as one of the “functions” of sentencing, as
distinguished from the normative “purposes” to be achieved by criminal sentences).
198
The findings of Mellon and his colleagues were in accord; across 10 cities, they found
high levels of variation in the commitment to consistency. See Mellon et al., supra note 25,
at 77.
199
Prosecutors in pyramidal, newbie-oriented Metro, for example, frequently commented
about the importance of consistent outcomes in both the drug and misdemeanor caseloads.
See, e.g., Prosecutor 251 (“[We] want to remain consistent as a whole because otherwise it
looks like one person is off in the field, where everyone else is doing one thing and they’re
doing the other. . . . [So] there is a lot of, ‘Oh, what would you do he[re]?’ then you kind of
come to a consensus together of what is appropriate sometimes.”); Prosecutor 128 (“[We]
hold each other accountable for how we are going to try a case, and what’s a good case, and
what’s a good decision in that case.”).
200
We acknowledge that this theory may suffer from a chicken–egg problem; that is, it
might be that Electeds who value consistency construct architectural features to support that
value, while Electeds who value individualized justice make other architectural choices.
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pluralism of the office’s discourse, assembling attorneys with different
experiences and views about filing strategies, standard plea offers, and
sentence recommendations. 201 Thus, a flatter office structure combined
with a veteran hiring preference gives attorneys access to a wider menu of
legitimate options.
But our interviews also reveal that the value a prosecutor’s office
places on consistency or individualism is not uniform; it is instead layered
and contextual, depending on source, timing, and audience. For example,
while an office’s social architecture might be built to emphasize either
conformity or individualization, discourses within the office might stress
the opposite value. In Metro, for example, where the background daily
routines and supervisory structures emphasize a team-based, conformist
professional identity and the value of consistency, oral messages from the
supervisors encourage employees to use individualized discretion. In fact,
the supervisor of the Misdemeanor Team explicitly says that his objective is
to promote the confidence of new attorneys in their own judgment. 202
Moreover, the overarching office philosophy of the Elected in Metro—to
“do the right thing” and to “do justice”—is taken to mean that a prosecutor
should consider the case-specific interests (of the particular defendant,
victim, and community) when crafting a sentencing recommendation.203 As
Prosecutor 251 put it:
I was told from the beginning we’re supposed to do what’s right. Do not only what
feels right but also just in practice, in seeing kind of what the norm is for certain
offenses, . . . but also taking into account the full context of the situation to try to do
what’s best for everybody involved if possible.

Words of trust and support, in short, can counterbalance or mute the effects
of the established architecture.204
201
Consider, for example, the Midway prosecutor who introduced a completely new
punishment—banishment—into the menu of punishments in the local courts based on her
experience in another county. Prosecutor 945. Other prosecutors in the office treated her
initiative as a curiosity, but not as a violation of office values. That they chose not to
emulate her initiative is not important—her point of view on the suitability of this probation
term is simply one of many that coexist in the office.
202
Interview with Supervising Attorney, Metro County, in Metro County (June 17,
2010).
203
The newbie attorneys on the team believe that their supervisors ultimately expect
thoughtfulness from them, not merely compliance. They view different rules as deserving of
different levels of compliance.
204
Likewise, distinctive aspects of the social architecture in an office otherwise marked
by autonomy might impose “subtle pressure” on its line staff “to be in line with general
averages and disposition rates”; that is, an office that exhibits “few outward controls” might
have “a good deal of internal consistency” due to a high level of collegiality, small size, and
use of a computer system to track case handling. Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 76
(describing Salt Lake City).
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While messaging from leadership can alter the expected balance
between consistency and individualization, the direction of the proposed
movement, together with the timing and audience, affect how that message
will be received. First, the socialization literature suggests that moving the
metaphorical office walls may be particularly difficult when the direction is
from independence to conformity. 205 This phenomenon arose in Midway,
where the line attorneys resisted and resented their Elected’s efforts to
impose more oversight after an initial laissez-faire approach. With regard
to timing, a shift in the preferred balance likely becomes more difficult the
longer the initial blend of values remains in place.
As for audience, the experience level of the office attorneys might also
affect the success of a proposed recalibration. New additions to the
architecture will be highly visible to veteran attorneys happy with the
original framing and experienced enough to know the difference. On the
other hand, newbies entering a well-established edifice for the first time
(that is, when they join a smoothly running, highly structured office) take
the structures for granted, treating them as permanent rather than transitory,
a natural part of the professional landscape.
In sum, the attorneys talk about the relative importance of consistency
and individualized treatment of defendants, and their answers correlate with
the office structures that surround them, but the correlations are not
unidimensional. We thus found ourselves wondering about actual behavior:
do prosecutors produce results that reflect the values they espouse, the
architecture within which they work, or some combination?
Although logic suggests that more consistent case outcomes will
appear in jurisdictions that are built to value consistency, we do not assume
that strong consistency-oriented internal office features will, in and of
themselves, produce consistent case outcomes.
There are several
competing pressures. First, while an office might aim for consistency,
actual case resolutions depend heavily on judicial and defense attorney
responses to prosecutorial overtures; 206 this is especially true in jurisdictions
that assign judges and prosecutors to courtrooms on a more-or-less
permanent basis. If we want to compare across jurisdictions with differing
courtroom rotation procedures, prosecutorial bail recommendations,
diversion eligibility letters, and plea offers would trump case outcomes as
proxies for an office’s commitment to consistency.
Secondly, internal office structures interact with statewide features of
205
See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 34 (arguing that when people move from a position
of high discretion to a position of lower discretion, they become unhappy and frustrated at
work).
206
This was one of Utz’s principal findings in her comparison between Alameda and San
Diego Counties in the 1970s. See UTZ, supra note 20.

1174

KAY L. LEVINE & RONALD F. WRIGHT

[Vol. 102

the legal environment to place greater or lesser weight on consistency of
outcomes in the jurisdiction. For instance, state sentencing laws applicable
in Midway and Ring give broad sentencing discretion to each judge, while
the sentencing laws applicable in Metro impose stricter guidelines on
sentencing judges to promote statewide uniformity of outcomes. 207
Moreover, limited court capacity might impose conformist pressures even
in offices that otherwise promote autonomy. For example, if there is only
one judge available to try all cases in the jurisdiction, that judge’s influence
will feature prominently in the number of negotiated pleas brought forth by
different prosecutors. 208
In light of these puzzles, we regret that we cannot test this second part
of our theory with the data we have collected to date. None of our research
sites employs a charging or sentencing grid that prosecutors are supposed to
follow, and none offered us access to their individual case files. If we had
such access, we could evaluate like cases (based on offense severity and the
offender’s prior criminal record) in light of the prosecutorial decisions
made: charges filed, bail recommendations, diversion eligibility, and all
plea offers. 209 Our ongoing research in additional jurisdictions will collect
aggregate office outcomes and link that data to surveys asking individual
prosecutors to characterize their own charging and case resolution choices
based on general principles and on hypothetical cases. This future work
will allow us to test the theory that we have developed here regarding the
relationship between office structures, professional identity, and
consistency of case-handling decisions.
B. OTHER EFFECTS ON OUTCOMES
Beyond inspiring a particular level of consistency in case handling, an
office’s social architecture and the correlative changes to attorneys’
professional identities might affect other individual or office outputs. Our
data suggest patterns in two spheres: career vision and relationship with
local law enforcement.
207

This is in accord with the findings of Mellon and his colleagues; jurisdictions
governed by tight sentencing rules experienced more uniformity in prosecutorial case
handling than jurisdictions that lacked such controls. See Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 75
(“Determinate sentencing, which is in effect in Indiana, greatly restricted the type of bargain
that the court would accept relative to length of sentence.”).
208
See Mellon et al., supra note 25, at 75–76 (describing the situation in Salt Lake City).
209
Indeed, such case-level information is not accessible for Midway or Ring Counties,
and only some of these categories would be available in Metro County. For an example of a
study based on a larger number of these variables than is typically available to researchers,
see Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of.
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 501 (1992).
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Turning first to the career vision point, an office’s particular
preference for hierarchy and experience can affect the line prosecutor’s
sense of her own future as a professional. An office that hires relatively
junior attorneys and signals the expected career path through hierarchical
organization is likely to promote and expect a future orientation among its
prosecutors. New arrivals picture themselves moving up within the office,
and ask what steps today will carry them further along the path as growing
professionals. For example, the Metro prosecutors view their current
activities as an investment in professional skills that will become more
important as they gain seniority in the office. 210 Chief among those skills is
the ability to exercise judgment in a way that conforms to the judgment of
their peers. 211
By contrast, veteran attorneys who work in offices that adopt flatter
structures are more likely to take a more limited, present-oriented approach
to the job. Because there are no obvious promotional ladders to climb and
fewer incentives to prove oneself as a rising star in an office such as Ring or
Midway, attorneys seem more focused on managing their present positions
than on trying to secure promotions. While they do ponder potential career
paths outside their current offices more frequently than the attorneys in
Metro, 212 they do not express anxiety about supervisors or senior peers
evaluating them for possible star qualities or advancement within the
office. 213 Given that attorneys at later stages of their careers may be drawn
to a flatter work environment, 214 we cannot conclusively say that the office
210

See HALL, supra note 60, at 48 (describing the career perspectives of newcomers who
want to advance in an organization); Ibarra, supra note 17 (describing the upward orientation
of new managers).
211
See Felkenes, supra note 39, at 112 (“Adherence to [group values] arises as much out
of the imitation of superiors as out of peer group conformity. Conformity to this set of
attitudes which are of utmost importance to the professional elders and of little importance to
the public may guarantee career opportunity.”).
This future orientation of the prosecutors in Metro is in line with the office’s explicit
cultivation of a long-term culture. The Elected asks new hires for a commitment of three
years of service (with some flexibility in individual cases) and seeks further commitments
before sending an attorney to any major training program. Additionally, the Elected aims to
create an environment that remains attractive to prosecutors even after their first few years
on the job, hoping to increase the number of attorneys who accept the necessary pay cut and
remain in the office as experienced prosecutors. Prosecutor 272.
212
See, e.g., comments by Prosecutors 900, 905, 915, 950, 960, 965.
213
One said she could do the job “with [her] eyes closed.” Prosecutor 960; see also
Prosecutor 900 (“[If] you’re still in misdemeanor prosecution after three plus years or after
four plus years, there is some type of reason and it’s usually because you just choose not to
be a felony prosecutor, that you’ve remained in a solicitor’s office.”).
214
Particularly in Midway, many of our interviewees took their positions precisely
because the lack of pressure for upward mobility would allow them to create a better balance
between their careers and their families and other life responsibilities. See Prosecutor 945
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structure itself dampens their professional drive; it may simply reinforce
what is already there.
Another “output” that might be affected by an office’s social
architecture and the prevailing professional identities of the attorneys who
work there is the interaction between prosecutors and law enforcement
officers. A prosecutor works closely with law enforcement, but they are not
in a direct hierarchical relationship. In that context, where the prosecutor
has to make tough choices about which cases to pursue and which to
decline, she often has to assert authority in a face-to-face conversation with
the arresting officer. The key challenge is to earn respect from the police
without taking cases that compromise ethical or efficiency standards of the
office. In the words of one of our respondents, the prosecutor has to be able
to “sit across from an officer in the room and say, ‘I’m sorry’ . . . . To have
that dialogue, it’s a different skill set . . . .” 215
Managing these role conflicts is a challenge for inexperienced
prosecutors, since they have yet to earn street credibility with officers or to
develop confidence in their own screening abilities. 216 As one attorney
from the Drug Team in Metro put it, “That’s the one hard thing that I had to
learn . . . . Because I’m the type of person that I like everybody to like me.
So of course if I’m rejecting [his] case and the officer doesn’t understand
why . . . you’re not going to be their friend.” 217 It can take years for a
prosecutor, assigned to a single unit, to form relationships with police
officers that are based on mutual respect and self-assurance, rather than on
the need to be liked. The Ring drug unit, for example, has maintained a
consistent face for about a decade, and its prosecutors report that they have
become like “family” with the officers on their cases. 218 In this
environment, Prosecutor 785 reports that he is regularly consulted before
police actions are planned, and that his institutional knowledge of drugenforcement techniques provides him with a source of authority
inexperienced prosecutors do not have. Offices that provide prosecutors
with long-term unit assignments rather than frequent rotations, and those
(“Right now someone asked me that [‘What do you see for yourself in the future?’] like
recently and I was just like, ‘You know, I’m just good. I’m good right now, you know.’
Like I say, I have a 15-month-old that keeps me really busy. And you know, I don’t know if
she’s older if I’ll go back into private practice or not. Right now I’m just really good with
where I am and what I’m doing.”).
215
Prosecutor 266 (explaining that the prosecutor’s challenge is to decline cases in a way
that promotes dialogue with the police about how to improve investigations).
216
This is in accord with the findings of Frederick and Stemen, who report that new
prosecutors often feel less confident in their abilities to confront police officers or decline
cases. See FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 58, at 11.
217
Prosecutor 161.
218
Prosecutor 735.
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that employ cadres of veterans rather than newbies, thus seem more likely
(than offices with contrasting features) to foster stable relationships
between prosecutors and police. 219 Our data reveal an interesting gender
dimension to this relationship, too; female prosecutors report that,
compared to their male colleagues, they feel less able to develop close and
respectful ties with law enforcement officers. 220
Putting aside career vision and relationships to police, there are several
other outcomes whose potential relationships to office structure and
professional identity inspire us to speculate, in the absence of data. For
example, is there any correlation between office structure and the sheer
volume of cases that prosecutors expect to handle?221 Economic theory
suggests that offices that promote a team mentality of interchangeable
attorneys could process more cases in certain high-volume settings, such as
drug cases, property crimes, or low-level assaults. On the other hand, office
structures that promote autonomy among attorneys might take better
advantage of specialized knowledge and overall could save time by not
instituting cross-checking, “self-monitoring” procedures.
We also might ask whether an office would respond differently to
allegations of wrongful convictions if the employees worked in more
hierarchical arrangements or were hired with more experience, as compared
to other structural formations. Either possibility is conceivable, but it seems
equally likely that on questions dealing with single high-visibility cases, the
personality and judgment of the Elected will determine the office response
more directly than the office structure or the professional identity it helps to
cultivate.
Finally, one might ask whether particular office structures and specific
professional identities lead some prosecutors to seek less severe outcomes
for criminal defendants—a question that is distinct from our earlier question
about the consistency of office outcomes. Can a prosecutor’s office create a
219
This is not to say that stability is always a positive value; “family”-type relationships
with police officers may cause a prosecutor to lose his objectivity.
220
See, e.g., Prosecutor 161 (stating that police officers “care about it, they worked on it,
you know, and then I’m this, you know, little girl that’s sitting in the chair like, [uses high
voice] ‘Oh yeah, that doesn’t look good,’ you know.”). We explore the gender angle further
in future work using this dataset.
221
Prior scholars have shown a correlation between certain structures and office
willingness to plea bargain, but that dependent variable would not get us very far here, since
our three research sites all extensively engage in plea bargaining. See, e.g., UTZ, supra note
20; Mellon et al., supra note 25; Lief Hastings Carter, The Limits of Order: Uncertainty and
Adaptation in a District Attorney’s Office 18–28 (Sept. 19, 1972) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with Doe Library, University of
California, Berkeley). Of course, as empirical tests of this theory take us (and others) to
offices with different combinations of structures, it may be fruitful to test the correlation
between office shape, hiring preference, and willingness to plea bargain.
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“culture of mercy,” endorsing the idea that prosecutors should at times
support the rehabilitation of defendants or endorse comparatively light
sentences for deserving defendants? Employees of all three offices profiled
here express a strong commitment to doing justice in individual cases, a
viewpoint that seems to embody a notion of relativism when it comes to
punishment and to allow for mercy in appropriate cases. But that view is
far from universal. We have recently spoken with prosecutors in offices
with more severely hierarchical shapes than the three sites we examine in
this Article, and some prosecutors in those offices told us that they are not
personally responsible for rehabilitation or mercy; any lessening of the full
weight of the criminal law as written, in their view, is the responsibility of
the sentencing judge or some other actor. Is this the result of steep
hierarchy, the political style of the Elected, or some other architectural
feature of the office? We cannot be sure, but variation on this issue
suggests that systematic research is needed to untangle the connections
between architectural features, professional identity, and the severity of
outcomes that an office actually produces.
Questions such as these become relevant and testable once we
spotlight the theoretical connections flowing from office structures to
professional identities to prosecutors’ performance. This research frontier
is wide open.
VI. CONCLUSION
Previous scholarly attempts to explain prosecutorial behavior have
offered us limited views of how prosecutors understand their jobs and
complete their work. Some portrayals look only outward (toward external
institutions that generally fail to sway prosecutorial behavior) and thus
leave us pessimistic about the ability to control prosecutorial discretion.
Others look only inward (toward the prosecutor’s individual conscience)
and thereby try to reassure us that regulation by external sources is
unnecessary.
To understand more fully how the prosecutor experiences her
professional role and the rule-of-law implications of that role, we must
account for the institutional fabric of the office itself. Our study has
focused attention on two key features of that institutional fabric:
organizational shape and hiring preference for experience. We have
explored correlations between these two aspects of office architecture and a
prosecutor’s professional identity. One specific feature of the prosecutor’s
professional identity—the development of an autonomous or team spirit—
does seem to correlate with the office environment. Consistent with the
sociological literature on organizations, we theorize and preliminarily find
that attorneys who work in pyramidal offices and who are hired without
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experience tend to embrace bureaucratic and group values to a much larger
degree than their counterparts in other office environments.
This team or autonomous conception of the prosecutor’s role has
secondary linkages to a prosecutor’s sense of connection to the rest of the
office, her relationship to other attorneys in the profession, her development
of a career vision, and her relationships with police. Prosecutors in the
more traditional bureaucratic offices, who tend to be hired without
experience into the lowest level of the organization, are quite nearsighted
when it comes to their colleagues in other units in the office and prosecutors
in other offices. They express relatively little interest in or connection to
people outside their limited spheres, whether they be other prosecutors or
police officers. Yet when it comes to career vision, the bureaucratic
prosecutors have it in spades—they regularly picture their futures in the
office. The experienced prosecutors in flat offices know a lot more about
what their colleagues are doing and are more likely to have relationships
with prosecutors in other offices and with local law enforcement. But they
have a more truncated sense of their career vision.
Lastly, the team-versus-autonomy dimension of the professional
identity might affect case-handling decisions. That is, the more an office
promotes consistency as a function of team spirit, the more likely its case
outcomes will be consistent across prosecutors. That being said, we do not
expect this relationship to be a simple correlation, due to the influence of
the criminal defense bar, the local judiciary, and the state legislative focus
on reducing sentencing disparity. While we do not test the proposition in
this Article, our theory points to a correlation between office structure,
identity, and case handling that can be tested in the future. Given the
limitations of criminal justice information systems, a combination of
statistical compilations and surveys of prosecutors will be necessary to
measure any effects on case outcomes. We expect to pursue multiple
measures of outputs as this research progresses.
Although our dataset in this first Article comprises only three offices,
it does reveal new dimensions of the institution of prosecution. First,
contrary to a common scholarly assumption, prosecutor’s offices are not all
hierarchical and specialized. While this structure is likely characteristic of
most large offices, when one considers all 2,300 state prosecutor’s offices
in the United States, organizational shape runs from the flat to the steeply
pyramidal. Second, line prosecutors do not simply mimic the professional
role that the Elected models for them, and prosecutors do not simply take
on the character of the Elected. The structural choices of a chief prosecutor
affect and reinforce the professional identities of the line prosecutors in the
office, independent of the example that the chief sets.
Indeed, structural changes in the office environment can change the
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professional role images at work there rather quickly. In an epilogue to our
field study, we note that two of the three offices (Metro and Midway)
changed leadership in early 2011. The new District Attorney in Metro kept
most of the existing office structures in place, producing only minimal
changes in attorney identities and performance.222 The new Solicitor
General in Midway, in contrast, moved the office toward more
specialization and midlevel supervision (a modestly more pyramidal shape),
and prosecutor conceptions of their roles started shifting after a brief
transition period. 223
Our exploration of office architecture and its correlation with
professional identity finally breaks an impasse in scholarly treatments of
prosecutorial discretion. A close study of internal office structures, in all
their varied forms, moves us past the dead-end observation that external
constraints are anemic and inadequate to legitimize modern prosecutorial
practices. At the same time, a search for patterns in prosecutorial offices
gets beyond the banal observation that every office is its own unique place,
every prosecutor her own unique person. Comparative institutional
research, with the prosecutor’s office as the unit of analysis, opens up a new
and generalizable body of knowledge. It reveals to the managers of a
prosecutor’s office just how profoundly they can shape the professional
identities and outputs of their attorneys, based simply on their
organizational choices. Most importantly, this research gives the public
(along with the journalists, academics, and other observers who serve as
their agents) a greater ability to evaluate the work done in their name in the
criminal courts.

222

Interview with Elected and First Assistant of Metro County District Attorney’s Office
(Oct. 11, 2011).
223
Second Interview with Prosecutor 950 (Sept. 12, 2011).

